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Institutions of the United States is Leaving the
Taxpayers with a Sour Taste in Their Mouths
By Anson Cain*
I. INTRODUCTION
At its best, a souffl6 rises dramatically above its rim to
create a light but substantial and crusty top layer
cushioned by a luxurious, creamy center that flows
slowly across the tongue, richly saucing the taste buds.
This contrast between exterior and interior is the
essence of a great souffl&1
Before baking a successful and delicious souffl6, a baker must
consider what ingredients to use, how to implement those ingredients
so they meld together, and the correct method to execute his designed
recipe. 2  Otherwise, the baker's finished product may look like a
successful souffle, but its various components may not come together
as envisioned and the souffl6 will only disappoint.3
Congress's bailout of the financial institutions through the
Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 (EESA) was very
much like a baker creating a bad souffl6. 4 Congress attempted to use
the vast ingredients at its disposal to create something successful, a
* J.D. candidate, 2010, Pepperdine University School of Law. B.A.,
Accounting and Business Administration, 2007, Point Loma Nazarene University.
1. Christopher Kimball, Creamy, Foolproof Dessert Souffles, Cook's
Illustrated, Sept. & Oct. 2000, at 23.
2. See id. at 23-25.
3. See id.
4. On Friday, October 3, 2008, President George W. Bush signed into law H.R.
1424, which enacted the EESA. The White House, infra note 51.
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bailout package that would immediately restore liquidity and stability
to the financial system of the United States. 5 Congress, however,
was in such a rush to implement the EESA, it seems it did not
consider how the ingredients would mold together or even how to
completely execute the recipe to achieve the desired goals of the
EESA.6 This lack of planning has caused taxpayers to have a sour
taste in their mouths with regard to the use of taxpayer dollars for the
EESA.7
Through the implementation of just one program under the
Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP), Congress has already
allocated over $195 billion to various financial institutions.8
Congress hoped this would help build capital to increase the flow of
financing to business and consumers. 9  These capital injections,
however, still have not increased the lending practices to either
party.10  In addition, no one even knows how these financial
institutions are using their government allocations because the TARP
participating financial institutions have neither a duty to disclose how
the funds are being used or to even account for the spending of such
5. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, §
2(1), 122 Stat. 3765, 3766 (2008). Congress had allocated a total of $700 billion to
the EESA so that the Secretary of the United States Department of the Treasury
could use these funds to restore liquidity and stability to the financial system.
Emergency Economic Stabilization Act § 115(a).
6. See infra notes 41-51 and accompanying text. After the first draft of the
EESA was proposed and rejected, the current draft of the EESA was passed in the
House of Representatives and the Senate and was enacted into law by President
Bush two weeks later. Id.
7. See infra notes 288-97 and accompanying text.
8. U.S. Dep't of Treasury, Office of Fin. Stability, Troubled Asset Relief
Program: Transaction Report (Feb. 2, 2009), available at
http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/eesa/docs/transaction-report_02-02-09.pdf
[hereinafter TARP Transaction Report]. As of January 30, 2009, the Capital
Purchase Program had spent over $195 billion on 361 different financial
institutions. Id.
9. See infra note 73 and accompanying text.
10. U.S. Government Accountability Office, GAO-09-296, Troubled Asset
Relief Program: Status of Efforts to Address Transparency and Accountability
Issues 68-69 (January 2009), available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09296.pdf [hereinafter GAO January 2009
Report].
bailout funds." These facts illustrate the lack of transparency, to the
public and the government, which is consistent throughout the EESA
and its programs.
Even though Congress had the foresight to provide oversight to
the EESA, the oversight lacks completeness and leaves many issues
of concern. Congress established two administrative agencies for the
overall oversight of the EESA, the Financial Stability Oversight
Board (FSOB) and the Congressional Oversight Panel (COP). 12
Along with one oversight entity already in existence, the Comptroller
General (CG) who is the director of the Government Accountability
Office, Congress also established another oversight entity, the
Special Inspector General of the Troubled Asset Relief Program (SIG
TARP), to perform audit oversight of the EESA.13 Even with these
oversight protections, there are too many holes in the program to
provide the necessary oversight of the EESA. 14
This article will outline and analyze the EESA, with regard to
how it is being applied under the laws applicable to the first
allocations of the TARP funds. Part II will briefly trace the
background and history of the economic crisis in the United States,
which prompted the need for the EESA, as well as the process in
which the EESA was enacted. 15 Part III will summarize the EESA
and go into detail regarding four of the major actions taken to
stabilize the financial institutions of the United States. 16 Part IV will
analyze the details regarding the EESA's four major oversight
entities and describe some of the trying issues present in each one. 17
Part V proposes methods to revamp the EESA's lack of transparency,
accountability of TARP funds, and lack of consequences for financial
institutions' failure to comply with the EESA and its programs.' 8
Finally, in Part VI, this article will conclude by summarizing the
11. See infra notes 287-327 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 182-83 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 183-84 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 186-285 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 20-51 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 52-180 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 181-286 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 287-348 and accompanying text.
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areas of the EESA that are in need of revision, and the anticipated
future of the remaining TARP funds. 19
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A. Causes of the Economic Crisis in the United States
The United States had major signs of an economic recession
beginning in early 2008. In March 2008, Bear Steams, one of the
biggest banks and brokerage firms in the world, was forced to accept
an emergency loan from JP Morgan Chase and the Federal Reserve
Bank of New York in order to avoid going insolvent.2 ° In addition,
in April 2008, America was hit with an airline crisis that caused five
airlines to go out of business in two weeks and another to file for
bankruptcy. 2' Other events foreshadowed America's economic
downturn as well, such as the record high prices for oil and gold.22
On April 9, 2008, the price for a barrel of oil reached $110, which
was a major reason for the airline crisis and other panic spread across
the United States.2 3 In March 2008, gold sold for more than $1,000
per ounce on the global market. 24 The price of gold set off alarms
when it was coupled with the fact that at the time the American dollar
was getting weaker.25 All of these factors contributed to the
economic crisis of 2008, but the largest contributor had to deal with
19. See infra notes 349-59 and accompanying text.
20. Yalman Onaran, Bear Stearns Gets Emergency Funds From JPMorgan,
BLOOMBERG.COM, March 14, 2008, available at
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&sid=aJnj OuYTjvOO&refer-
home.
21. Peppercoin Insurance, Economic Credit Crisis of 2008,
http://www.peppercoin.com/200805/economic-credit-crisis-of-2008 (last visited
Feb. 12, 2009).
22. Ben Rooney, Getting in on the Gold Rush, CNN MONEY.COM, Mar. 13,
2008, available at http://money.cnn.com/2008/03/13/pf/gold-howto/index.htm;
Kenneth Musante, Oil Reaches $112 for the First Time, CNN Money.com, Apr. 9,
2008, available at
http://money.cnn.com/2008/04/09/markets/eia/index.htm?postversion=20080409 1.
23. Musante, supra note 22.
24. Rooney, supra note 22.
25. Id.
the subprime mortgage crisis caused by the downturn in the housing
market that led to the demise of many major financial institutions.
Over the past decade, the lending practices utilized by the
financial institutions have become relaxed and irresponsible. In the
early 1990s, someone looking for a loan had to place, on average, a
twenty percent down payment of the purchase price and had to prove
possession of sufficient income to be able to repay the loan in a
timely fashion. 26 Even with these restrictions, potential buyers who
met these requirements were often denied loans.27  Starting around
1997, financial institutions began making high-risk mortgage loans to
high-risk borrowers, including illegal immigrants. 28 A form of these
high risk loans included the "No Income, No Job, and No Assets"
loans, which helped bring the average down payment for first-time
home buyers to two percent, and forty-three percent of the buyers
made no down payment whatsoever.2 9  Other forms of high risk
loans that were made highly available were interest-only adjustable
rate mortgages.3" These allowed the homeowner to pay solely the
interest, not the principal, during an initial period. 3' Financial
institutions were also highly dependent on automated loan approval
systems, which have been accused of not having the appropriate
review and documentation. 32 In 2007, forty percent of all subprime
loans were generated by automated underwriting.3 3 As the housing
bubble burst and housing prices began to depreciate, refinancing
26. lIolden Lewis, Programs that Cure the Down-Payment Blues,
BANKRA1I.COM, http://www.bankrate.com/brm/news/mtg/20020110a.asp (last
visited Feb. 12, 2009).
27. Id.
28. Charles W. Calomiris and Joseph R. Mason, High Loan-to-Value
Mortgage Lending: Problem or Cure?, AEI PRESS, 22 (1999), available at
http://www.aei.org/docLib/20021130_71252.pdf.
29. World-Crisis.net, Real Estate Bubble,
http://www.istockanalyst.com/article/viewarticle+articleid_2531032.html (last
visited Feb. 12, 2009).
30. Id. The value of United States subprime mortgages was estimated at $1.3
trillion as of March 2007. Id. Approximately sixteen percent of subprime loans
with adjustable rate mortgages were ninety days delinquent or in foreclosure as of
October of 2007. Id. This is almost triple the rate of 2005. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
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became more difficult. This burst led people to begin to default on
their loans as their loans reset to higher interest rates and payment
amounts. As of March 2008, an estimated 8.8 million homeowners
had zero or negative equity in their homes, causing many
homeowners to default on their loans. 34 The vast amount of loans
defaulting has caused financial institutions, from around the world, to
recognize subprime related losses and write-downs exceeding $501
billion as of August 2008.35
All of these negative economic situations, which occurred around
the United States, prompted financial concerns for investors and
caused their rapid withdrawal from the stock market. On September
8, 2008, the United States government seized two of the nation's
largest financial companies, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, who
provided around three-quarters of new home mortgages to American
citizens. 36 If this was not enough, 158-year old Lehman Brothers
Holdings, Inc. collapsed into bankruptcy one week later.37 This
accelerated the downward spiral of American International Group.38
Additionally, there was the forced merger of Merrill Lynch and Bank
of America worth roughly $50 billion.39 This was followed with the
largest failure in U.S. banking history when Washington Mutual, Inc.
was forced to strike a deal to sell the bulk of its operations to J.P.
34. Id. This was almost eleven percent of all the homeowners in the United
States and the fact they had zero equity in their home meant their homes were
worth less than their mortgages. Id. This provided an incentive to "walk away"
from their homes despite the negative credit rating that would ensue. See id.
35. Onaran, supra note 20.
36. James R. Hagerty et al., U.S. Seizes Mortgage Giants, WALL ST. J., Sept. 8,
2008, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122079276849707821.html.
The Treasury Department will acquire $1 billion of preferred shares in Fannie Mae
and Freddie Mac without providing immediate cash, and has pledged to provide up
to $200 billion to both as they cope with the heavy losses on mortgage debt. Id.
37. Carrick Mollenkamp et al., Lehman's Demise Triggered Cash Crunch
Around Globe, WALL ST. J., Sept. 29, 2008, available at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB 122266132599384845.html.
38. Vikas Bajaj, Wall St. Goliath Teeters Amid Fear of Wider Crisis, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 13, 2008, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/14/business/14spiral.html.
39. Associated Press, Bank of America to Buy Merrill Lynch, MSNBC, Sept.
15, 2008, available at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/26708958.
Morgan Chase & Co. on September 26, 2008.40 The collapse of
these financial institutions, and others, alarmed the American public
and motivated the government to take action in an attempt to stabilize
the economy.
B. The Process of Enacting the Emergency Economic Stabilization
Act of 2008
On September 20, 2008, United States Treasury Secretary Henry
Paulson introduced a plan that was designed to help fix the problems
associated with America's financial institutions' holdings of illiquid
mortgage backed securities. 4 1 This plan was named the TARP. 42
Over the next week, Congressional leaders, including both 2008
presidential candidates, started working with the Bush
Administration and the Treasury department on finalizing Paulson's
initial proposal.4 3  On September 29, 2008, the House of
Representatives put the economic bailout proposal to a vote under
amendment H.R. 3997.44 The amendment was rejected by a roll call
vote of 228 to 205, with one person abstaining. 45 The rejection of
H.R. 3997 caused stocks to further plummet.46 The Dow Jones
dropped nearly 788 points, which was the largest single day point
drop ever, and the stock market lost approximately $1.2 trillion in
40. Robin Sidel et al., WaMu is Seized, Sold Off to JP. Morgan, In Largest
Failure in U.S. Banking History, WALL ST. J., Sept. 26, 2008, available at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB 122238415586576687.html.
41. Deborah Solomon and Damian Paletta, U.S. Bailout Plan Calms Markets,
But Struggle Looms Over Details, WALL ST. J., Sept. 20, 2008, available at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB 122186549098258645.html.
42. Text of Draft Proposal for Bailout Plan, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 20, 2008,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/21/business/21 draftcnd.html.
43. David M. Herszenhorn and Carl Hulse, Breakthrough Reached in
Negotiations on Bailout, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 2008, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/28/business/28bailout.html.
44. H.R. 3997, (Sept. 29, 2008) available at
http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2008/roll674.xml.
45. Id.
46. Alexandra Twin, Stocks Crushed, CNNMoney.com, Sept. 29, 2008,
available at
http://money.cnn.com/2008/09/29/markets/markets-newyork/index.htm.
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market value.47 This provided even more motivation for the Senate
to pass a bill that would fix America's economic crisis. On October
1, 2008, the Senate voted on a revised version of the EESA, which
was attached as an amendment to H.R. 1424.48 The amendment,
along with the entire bill, was passed by the Senate with a vote of 74
to 25.4  On October 3, 2008, the House of Representatives passed
H.R. 1424 by a vote of 263 to 161, which sent the bill to the
President of the United States for final approval. 50 A few hours later,
President George W. Bush signed the bill into law, empowering the
Treasury Department to use up to $700 billion to rescue America
from the crisis of their failing financial institutions.5
1
III. THE EMERGENCY ECONOMIC STABILIZATION ACT OF 2008
A. A Basic Summary
The EESA was generally established to grant the Secretary with
the authority to restore liquidity and stability to the financial system
of the United States. 52 This authority must be used by the Secretary
in a manner that "protects home values, college funds, retirement
accounts, and life savings; preserves homeownership and promotes
jobs and economic growth; maximizes overall returns to the
taxpayers of the United States; and provides public accountability for
the exercise of such authority. '5
3
The main component of the EESA is the establishment of the
TARP.54 Under this program, the Secretary was authorized to
47. Id.
48. H.R. 1424, 110th S. (Oct. 1, 2008), available at
http://www.senate.gov/egislative/LIS/roll-call-lists/roll-call-vote-cfi-n.cfm?congr
ess= I10&session=2&vote=00213.
49. Id.
50. H.R. Doc. No. 681 (Oct. 3, 2008), available at
http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2008/rol681 .xml.
51. The White House, President Bush Signs H.R. 1424 Into Law, (Oct. 3,
2008), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2008/ 10/20081003-
17.html.
52. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act § 2(1).
53. Id. at § 2(2).
54. Id. at § 101-36.
purchase, and to make commitments to purchase "troubled assets" 55
from any "financial institution" 56 on any terms and conditions that
are determined by the Secretary to be in accordance with the
EESA.57 The EESA also established the Office of Financial Stability
(OFS), through which the Secretary will implement any necessary
program for the TARP.58 Furthermore, the Secretary has the power
to take any action the Secretary finds necessary to carry out the
authorities of the EESA.59
Through the EESA, Congress gave the Secretary access to $700
billion to purchase troubled assets. 60 These funds were available to
55. Id. at § 3(9). Congress envisioned the TARP to purchase troubled assets
that were defined as "residential or commercial mortgages and any securities,
obligations, or other instruments that are based on or related to such mortgages,
that in each case was originated or issued on or before March 14, 2008, the
purchase of which the Secretary determines promotes financial market stability."
Id. at § 3(9)(a). However, Congress envisioned that there may also be
circumstances of such assets that would not fit the first definition, so Congress gave
the Secretary claim to any other financial instrument as a troubled asset in which
the purchase would be necessary to promote financial stability. Id. at § 3(9)(b).
The only limit to this authority is that the Secretary must first consult with the
Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and submit
such a determination to the appropriate committees of Congress in writing. Id. at §
3(9)(b).
56. Id. at § 3(5). Only financial institutions may participate in TARP. Id. at §
101(a). The EESA defines a financial institution as "any institution, including but
not limited to" an example list of financial institutions that are "established and
regulated" under the laws of the Unites States and have "significant operations in
the United States." Id. at § 3(5). Even though this definition leaves gray areas as
to what technically is a financial institution, it clearly excludes foreign central
banks and any institution owned by a foreign government. Id.
57. Id. at § 101(a)(1). However, the EESA also requires that the Secretary sell
the assets at a time and price that maximizes their value to taxpayers, who will gain
value from these proceeds by the paying down of the national debt. Id. at § 106.
58. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act § 101(a)(3). This new
administrative agency is an executive agency and a subunit within the Office of
Domestic Finance of the Department of the Treasury. Id.
59. Id. at § 101(c). This includes the authority to hire employees, enter into
contracts, designate financial institutions as financial agents of the Federal
Government, and establish vehicles that can purchase, hold, and sell troubled assets
and issue obligations. Id. at §§ 101(c)(l)-(4). In addition, the Secretary is
authorized to issue regulations and guidance to define terms or carry out the
authorities or purposes of the EESA. Id. at § 101(c)(5).
60. Id. at § 115(a).
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the Secretary in three different stages, with the first stage
automatically granting the Secretary access to $250 billion.6' The
next stage, which could occur at any time, would bestow an
additional $100 billion to the Secretary, if the President issues a
written certification to Congress. 62  The last $350 billion of the
bailout would only be available to the Secretary as long as Congress
does not enact a joint resolution disapproving the Secretary's plan to
use the remainder of the bailout funds. 63
With the EESA granting the Secretary an enormous amount of
discretion to use $700 billion of taxpayers' money, Congress also
established and delegated oversight to various administrative
agencies. 64  The EESA established three different administrative
agencies. 65 Two had the duty to provide general oversight of the
EESA program. 66 In order to oversee the auditing of the EESA, the
other newly established oversight entity was paired with an entity
already in existence. 67 These entities, along with others, are what
protect against the abuse of the Secretary's authority and ensure the
stability of the taxpayers' money. 68
On October 14, 2008, the Treasury launched its first program
under the TARP, the Capital Purchase Program (CPP), and disclosed
the Secretary's departure from Congress's original plan to purchase
toxic assets from the financial institutions.69 Instead, the Secretary
would use a total of $250 billion for the CPP, with the first allotment
going to nine American bank holding companies that were
61. Id.
62. Id. at § 115(a)(2).
63. Id. at §§ 115(a)(3); 115(c). In order for the Secretary to receive this
money, the Secretary must submit a written report that outlines the use of the funds,
after which Congress has fifteen calendar days to issue their joint resolution. Id. at
§ 115(c). If Congress does not issue its joint resolution within the fifteen day
window, then the Secretary is automatically authorized to use the remaining $350
billion. Id. at § 115(a)(3).
64. See infra notes 181-85 and accompanying text.
65. See infra notes 181-84 and accompanying text.
66. See infra notes 181-82 and accompanying text.
67. See infra note 184 and accompanying text.
68. See infra notes 181-86 and accompanying text.
69. See Jeanne Sahadi, Rescue Plan: What's In It, CNNMoney.com, (Oct. 14,
2008) http://money.cnn.com/2008/10/14/news/economy/rescue-plan-foursteps.
determined to be systematically important to the economy. 70  In
addition to this program, the Secretary worked with various
government agencies to initiate other actions that would strengthen
the United States' financial market. These actions mainly include the
Systemically Significant Failing Institution Program (SSFI Program),
the Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Program (TLG Program), and the
temporary increase in deposit insurance.71
B. Programs Initiated Through the Emergency Economic
Stabilization Act in Order to Stabilize the United States' Financial
Institutions
1. The Capital Purchase Program
On October 14, 2008, the Treasury announced the first program
to be launched under the EESA, the CPP.7 2 This voluntary program
was designed to "encourage U.S. financial institutions to build their
capital base, which in turn will increase the capacity of those
institutions to lend to U.S. businesses and consumers and to support
the U.S. economy and stabilize the financial system., 73  The CPP
70. Of the $250 billion that can be distributed, there is a limit to $25 billion per
financial institution. This initial injection to the United States banking system was
distributed as followed: Citigroup-$25 billion; JP Morgan Chase-$25 billion; Bank
of America-$25 billion (including $5 billion for its Merrill Lynch acquisition);
Wells Fargo-$25 billion (including $5 billion for its Wachovia acquisition);
Goldman Sachs-$10 billion; Morgan Stanley-$10 billion; Bank of New York-$2 to
$3 billion; Mellon Bank-$2 to $3 billion; and State Street Bank-$2 to $3 billion.
Treasury to Infuse $250 Billion of Capital into Nine Largest Banks, Blank Rome
LLP, Oct. 14, 2008,
http://www.blankrome.com/index.cfm?contentID=37&itemlD=1679. This was a
major occurrence because it left only $450 billion available to carry out the rest of
the TARP as it was originally contemplated by Congress. Id.
71. 1 Fin. Stability Oversight Bd. Q. Rep. 13-16 (2008) [hereinafter FSOB
First Report]. In addition, the Secretary has also established others programs
called the Targeted Investment Program and the Asset Guarantee Program. Id.
72. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act, U.S. Dept. of the Treasury (Mar.
24, 2009), available at www,treasury.gov/initiatives/eesa/program-
descriptions/cpp.shtml.
73. U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, Second Tranche Report to Congress at 2 (Dec.
2, 2008), available at
Congress's First RecipeSpring 2009
224 Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary 29-1
enabled the Treasury to purchase up to $250 billion of senior
preferred shares of stock and warrants for future Treasury purchases
of common stock in these institutions. 74 On October 28, 2008, the
Treasury signed an agreement with nine financial institutions that
were considered systematically important to the U.S. because, when
combined, they held fifty percent of all United States deposits.
75
These nine financial institutions were allocated $125 billion, which is
half of the total amount available under the CPP. 76 As of December
31, 2008, the CPP has spent $187,539,500 in a total of 217 private
and public financial institutions in over forty states and Puerto
Rico. 7
7
Funding through the CPP will be available to all sized qualified
institutions, which includes publicly traded and privately held
financial institutions.78 Bank holding companies, financial holding
companies, insured depository institutions, and savings and loan
holding companies that are engaged solely or predominately in
activities that are permissible for financial holding companies, under
relevant law, may be eligible to participate in the Cpp.79 In addition,
the institution must be established and regulated under the laws of the
United States and must have significant operations in the United
States; however, it cannot be controlled by either a foreign bank or a
http ://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/eesa/docs/TransactionReport- 11212008.pdf
[hereinafter Second Tranche Report].
74. Id.
75. U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, First Tranche Report to Congress at 2 (Nov. 4,
2008), available at http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/eesa/docs/Tranche-
Reportfinal.pdf [hereinafter First Tranche Report].
76. U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, Section 105(a) Troubled Asset Relief Program
Report at 8 (Jan. 6, 2009), available at
http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/eesa/docs/105Report_010609.pdf [hereinafter
Second Section 105(a) TARP Report].
77. Id. at 8-10.
78. Neel Kashkari, Interim Assistant Secretary for Financial Stability, Remarks
on Financial Markets and TARP Update (Dec. 5, 2008), available at
http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/hp 1314.htm.
79. U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, Application Guidelines for TARP Capital
Purchase Program at 1 (2009), available at
http://www.treas.gov/initiatives/eesa/docs/application-guidelines.pdf [hereinafter
Application Guidelines for CPP].
foreign company. 80  Even though all financial institutions use the
same CPP application form, there are different deadlines to submit
the CPP application depending on the type of financial institution
applying. 8' This application must be submitted to the financial
institution's primary regulator. 82  The Treasury has established a
standardized evaluation process to help ensure that all regulators use
the same standards when reviewing applications to ensure
consistency. 83 Once the primary regulator has completed its
evaluation, the application is sent with the regulator's
recommendation to the OFS for final approval, further inquiry, or
rejection. 84
If an application for the CPP is accepted, then the amount of
funding that can be given to the financial institution cannot be less
than one percent of its risk-weighted assets and could not be more
than the lesser of $25 billion or three percent of its risk weighted
80. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act § 3.
81. Application Guidelines for CPP, supra note 79, at 1. All applications to
participate in the CPP by a publicly traded financial institution must be submitted
no later than November 14, 2008. Id. For any privately held financial institution
whose stock is not traded on the national securities exchange, they have until
December 8, 2008 to submit an application to participate in the CPP. Id.
82. U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, Responses to Questions of the First Report of
the Congressional Oversight Panel for Economic Stabilization, at 11 (Dec. 30,
2008), available at
http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/reports/123108 %20cop%20response.pdf
[hereinafter Treasury Responses to COP]. The financial institution's primary
regulator can be either the Federal Reserve, the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (FDIC), the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), or the
Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS). Id.
83. Id. These banking regulators are to consider bank examination ratings,
selected performance ratios, and also the financial institutions' intended use of the
capital injection. 1 Congressional Oversight Panel Rep. 28 (Dec. 10, 2008),
available at http://cop.senate.gov/documents/cop-121008-report.pdf [hereinafter
First COP Report]. The Treasury values the expertise of the Federal banking
agencies, and will give considerable weight to their recommendations. Id.
Financial institutions that have higher bank examination ratings are presumptively
approved by the regulators. Id. However, those with lower bank examination
ratings are sent to the CPP Council for further consideration where the Council
may also look at additional factors such as the existence of a signed merger
agreement and private equity investment. Id.
84. Second Tranche Report, supra note 73, at 2.
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assets.85 In exchange for the capital funding, the financial institution
will issue to the Treasury non-voting preferred stock with a
liquidation value equal to the funding provided, plus warrants for
future common stock purchases.86 The preferred stock will be
nonvoting, cumulative, perpetual, will rank senior to common stock,
and is pari passu to existing senior preferred stock.87 The senior
preferred stock will pay quarterly dividends at a rate of five percent
per year for the first five years, and will be adjusted to nine percent
thereafter.88 This preferred stock cannot be redeemed within the first
three years from the date of the investment, unless the institution uses
the proceeds from a "Qualified Equity Offering" which results in
aggregate gross proceeds of at least twenty-five percent of the issue
price of the preferred stock.89 Three years from the date of this CPP
investment, the preferred stock may be redeemed at any time, at the
option of the financial institution.9" Regardless of when the stock is
finally redeemed, there are different pricing scales depending on
whether the stock is cumulative or non-cumulative. 91 All forms of
85. U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, Tarp Capital Purchase Program: Summay of
Senior Preferred Terms, at 1 (2008), available at
http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/reports/termsheet.pdf [hereinafter CPP Term
Sheet].
86 Id. at 1-5.
87. Id. at 1-2. The preferred stock is nonvoting, unless the institution does not
issue the dividend to the Treasury for six quarters, regardless of whether or not the
dividend is consecutive. Id. at 3. If the financial institution does not issue a
dividend for six quarters, then through the use of the preferred stock the Treasury
can elect two directors to add to any directors elected by shareholders of the other
classes of preferred stock. Id. This right to elect directors will end when full
dividends have been paid for four consecutive dividend periods. Id.
88. Id. at 2. If the senior preferred stock is issued by a bank that is a subsidiary
of the holding companies, then the financial institution will pay cumulative
dividends. Id. If the Senior Preferred stock is issued by banks which are not
subsidiaries of holding companies, then the financial institution will pay non-
cumulative dividends. Id.
89. Id. A qualified equity offering is the sale, after the date of the CPP
investment, of qualifying preferred stock or common stock for cash. Id.
90. CPP Term Sheet, supra note 85, at 2. After three years from the CPP
investment, the preferred stock can be redeemed in whole or in part. Id.
91. Id. The redemption of any cumulative preferred stock will be at 100
percent of its issue price, plus any accrued and unpaid dividends. Id. Furthermore,
the redemption of any non-cumulative preferred stock will be at 100 percent of its
redemption are subject to the approval of the financial institution's
primary federal bank regulator.92 These preferred shares owned by
the Treasury are not subject to any contractual restrictions which may
limit their transferability. 93
The standardized terms of the CPP, used by all participating
financial institutions, also include restrictions on the financial
institutions to protect the taxpayers' investment and provisions to
enable taxpayers to benefit from the future profitability of the firm.
9 4
For financial institutions participating in the CPP, there is a
restriction on issuing dividends and redeeming other shares of
stock. 95 If there is "any Senior Preferred stock outstanding," then the
financial institution cannot declare or pay any dividends "on junior
preferred shares, preferred shares ranking pari passu with the Senior
Preferred, or common shares." 96 In addition, as long as any Senior
Preferred shares are outstanding, then the financial institution may
not "redeem any junior preferred share, preferred shares ranking par
passu with the Senior Preferred or common shares," unless the
dividends are correctly paid for the cumulative or non-cumulative
Senior Preferred shares of stock.97 Financial institutions are also
restricted from increasing any common dividends per share for a
maximum of three years after the CPP investment is made, unless
they receive the financial institution's consent. 98  The Treasury's
issue price, plus any accrued and unpaid dividends for the then current dividend
period regardless of whether any dividends are declared. Id. After all the preferred
stocks held by the Treasury are redeemed, the financial institution may repurchase
any other equity security of theirs that the Treasury is holding. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, Section 105(a) Troubled Asset Relief Program
Report at 3 (Dec. 5, 2008), available at
http://www.treas.gov/initiatives/eesa/docs/TARPfirst- 1 05report.pdf [hereinafter
First Section 105(a) TARP Report].
95. CPP Term Sheet, supra note 85, at 2.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 2-3. For cumulative Senior Preferred shares of stock, all of the
accrued and unpaid dividends for all past dividend periods must be fully paid. Id.
at 3. For non-cumulative Senior Preferred shares of stock, only the full dividend
for the latest completed dividend period must be declared and paid in full. Id.
98. Id. However, a financial institution may increase its common dividends
per share, prior to the three years of the CPP investment if the senior preferred
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consent is also required for any share repurchases until three years
from the date of the CPP investment, unless the Senior Preferred
shares have been totally redeemed or completely transferred to third
parties. 99
Another major restriction on the financial institutions
participating in the CPP is that they must comply with new executive
compensation requirements. 100 At or before signing the securities
purchase agreement with the Treasury, the financial institution must
have changed its senior executive officers' (SEO) 10 1 compensation to
comply with Section 1 11 of the EESA. "2 In order to comply with
section 11 l(b)(2)(A) of the EESA, the financial institution's
"compensation committee"'10 3 must review the SEO incentive
compensation arrangements to make sure they do not encourage
unnecessary and excessive risks that could threaten the value of the
financial institution.10 4  In addition, the financial institution's
shares are completely redeemed or the Treasury has transferred all of the Senior
Preferred shares to third parties. Id.
99. Id. There is an exception to this statement. The Treasury's consent is not
required for repurchases of the senior preferred shares, junior preferred shares, or
common shares that are in connection with any benefit plan that is in the ordinary
course of business and is consistent with past practices. Id.
100. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act §§ 111, 302.
101. First, an SEO is a "named executive officer" who is employed by a
financial institution participating in the CPP while the Treasury holds an equity or
debt position acquired under the CPP. TARP Capital Purchase Program, 31 C.F.R.
Part 30 § 30.2 (2008). Second, a named executive officer is the principal executive
officer (PEO), the principal financial officer (PFO), and the three highest
compensated executive officers other than the PEO or the PFO. Id. To determine
the three most highly compensated executive officers one must look at the officer's
total compensation for the last completed fiscal year, as stated in Item 402 of
Regulation S-K. Id.
102. U.S. Dep't of Treasury, Capital Purchase Program: Securities Purchase
Agreement, § 4.10 (2008), available at
http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/reports/spa.pdf.
103. If a financial institution does not have a compensation committee, they
can still comply with section 11 1(b)(2)(A) of the EESA by using another
committee acting in a similar capacity. 31 C.F.R. Part 30 § 30.3.
104. Id. The compensation committee should discuss with the financial
institution's senior risk officers about the long-term and short-term risks that could
threaten the value of the financial institution. Id. at § 30.4. The compensation
committee should then review the SEO's incentive compensation arrangements to
see if they could lead SEOs to take such risks. Id. If anything is found that could
compensation committee must meet, review, and "certify"'0 5 that it
has completed the review of the SEO's compensation arrangements
on an annual basis, if not more frequently.1"6 For a financial
institution to comply with section 11 l(b)(2)(B) of the EESA, they
must require any SEO bonuses and incentive compensation paid
while the Treasury holds an equity or debt position in the financial
institution to be subject to being recovered or claw-backed by the
financial institution.0 7 This will occur if the payments were based
on materially inaccurate statements or any other materially inaccurate
performance metric criteria used to award bonuses and incentive
compensation. 0 8  In addition, financial institutions' taxable
deductions for an executive's remuneration attributed to services
performed, is reduced from $1,000,000 to $500,000 for any financial
institutions participating in the CPP. 109
The last provision of section 111 of the EESA which financial
institutions must comply with prohibits a financial institution from
paying a "golden parachute" payment to any SEO while the Treasury
holds any equity or debt position, acquired under the CPP, in these
financial institutions." 0 In order to be deemed a prohibited golden
lead SEOs to take such risks, then these features in the compensation arrangements
should be limited to remove the incentive of taking these unnecessary or excessive
risks. Id.
105. The following sentence is an example of a statement which will satisfy
the certification requirement of section 11 1(b)(2)(A): "The compensation
committee certifies that it has reviewed with senior risk officers the SEO incentive
compensation arrangements and has made reasonable efforts to ensure that such
arrangement do not encourage SEOs to take unnecessary and excessive risks that
threaten the value of the financial institution." Id. at § 30.5(a). For public
companies, they should files this certification in the "Compensation Discussion and
Analysis required pursuant to Item 402(b) of Regulation S-K under the federal
securities laws (17 C.F.R. § 229.402)." Id. at § 30.5(b). Private financial
institutions must still file the same certification, but with their primary regulatory
agency. Id. at § 30.5(c).
106. Id. at § 30.3.
107. Id. at § 30.6.
108. Id.
109. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act § 302. However, this provision
still does not limit the compensation for the executives of financial institutions that
participate in the TARP. Id. Instead, this provision only limits the financial
institution's taxable deduction for the compensation due to its executives. Id.
110. Id. at § 11l (b)(2)(C).
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parachute payment under section 11 l(b)(2)(C) of the EESA, the
payment must be made to a SEO on account of an "applicable
severance from employment""'  and the present value of all such
payments of compensation equals or exceeds three times the SEO's
base compensation amount. 112 All of these restrictions on executive
compensation apply to institutions that participate in the CPP and
will continue to apply to institutions that are later acquired by another
company that is not participating in the CPP. 1 3 In addition, a
company cannot become subject to these executive compensation
restrictions merely by acquiring a company that is participating in the
CPP. 114
The Treasury will also receive, in addition to the senior preferred
shares of stock, warrants for common shares of stock from the
financial institutions participating in the CPP, which will allow
taxpayers to benefit from any appreciation in the market value of the
invested financial institution.1 5 These warrants have a ten year term
equal to fifteen percent of the Senior Preferred shares amount on the
date of the investment, which may be further reduced as time
S111. This generally occurs when an SEO is either "involuntarily terminated"
from the financial institution or when an SEO's employment is terminated in
connection with any bankruptcy filing, insolvency, or receivership of the financial
institution. 31 C.F.R. Part 30 § 30.9. For the purposes of section 11 (b), an SEO
is involuntarily terminated when an employer independently exercises unilateral
authority to terminate the SEO's services, even though the SEO is willing and able
to continue performing services. Id. In two voluntary instances, the voluntary
termination of an SEO will be considered an involuntary termination under Section
11 (b). Id. The first instance is when an SEO voluntarily terminates himself or
herself due to a materially negative change in the SEO's employment relationship.
Id. The second instance occurs when the facts and circumstances of the
employment indicate the employer would have terminated the SEO bad he or she
not voluntarily terminated himself or herself and the SEO had knowledge that he or
she was going to be terminated. Id.
112. 26 U.S.C. § 280G(e).
113. 31 C.F.R. Part 30 § 3.1 l(a). Once the participating financial institution is
acquired by a non-participating company, the restrictions on executive
compensation will continue to apply until the earlier of one year after the
acquisition or when the Treasury ceases to hold any equity or debt in the
institution. Id.
114. Id.
115. First Tranche Report, supra note 75, at 3.
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passes.116 The exercise price of warrants is based on a twenty
trading-day trailing average price of common stock from the date the
financial institution entered the CPP; however, the price can also be
reduced for every six months that the financial institution has not
received consent from its shareholders for issuing the warrants. 1
17
These warrants are immediately exercisable, in whole or in part, 18
and the Treasury has agreed not to exercise any voting power
stemming from the common stock obtained through these
warrants. 119
2.Temporary Increase in Deposit Insurance
When the EESA was enacted on October 3, 2008, it also
temporarily raised the basic limit on the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation's (FDIC) insurance coverage from $100,000 to $250,000
per depositor for all deposit categories. 120 This temporary increase in
FDIC insurance is only effective until December 31, 2009.121 The
deposit insurance was increased to help reassure Americans
concerned about the safety of their bank accounts and to help prevent
a widespread fear of the collapse of the financial market causing a
run on banks. 122
3.Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Program
On October 14, 2008, the FDIC announced the TLG Program as
an attempt to circumvent the nationwide crisis relating to America's
116. CPP Term Sheet, supra note 85, at 4-5. The number of warrants will be
reduced by fifty percent if the financial institution can receive gross proceeds equal
to at least 100 percent of the Senior Preferred stock by December 31, 2009. Id.
117. Id. at 4. The reduction can only reduce the exercise price of the warrants
by a maximum of forty-five percent. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 5.
120. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act § 136.
121. Id.
122. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Emergency Economic
Stabilization Act of 2008 Temporarily Increases Basic FDIC Insurance Coverage
from $100,000 to $250,000 Per Depositor, Oct. 7, 2008,
http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/press/2008/prO8093.html.
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financial institutions.123 The FDIC believed that this program would
preserve confidence in the banking system and would encourage
liquidity so that financial institutions could lend to creditworthy
businesses and consumers. 124 This program is a "voluntary and time-
limited program that will be funded through special fees without
reliance on taxpayer funding."' 125 The TLG Program consists of two
different temporary programs. 126 First, a Debt Guarantee Program
was established to guarantee "newly-issued senior unsecured debt of
insured depository institutions and most U.S. holding companies." 127
Second, the Transaction Account Guarantee Program was created
and designed to guarantee "certain noninterest-bearing depository
institutions." 128 The FDIC believes these two programs will help
increase the available capital and lower the cost of credit. 129
On October 29, 2008, the FDIC published an interim rule that
was designed to implement the TLG Program and gave the public a
fifteen-day opportunity to make comments. 130 The FDIC received
many comments and later created an Amended Interim Rule on
November 4, 2008, while still requesting additional comments. 13 1
After receiving over 700 comments regarding the Interim Rule and
the Amended Interim Rule, the FDIC executed a Final Interim Rule
regarding the TLP Program on November 26, 2008.132
The Final Rule established which institutions were eligible to
participate in either the Debt Guarantee Program, Transaction
Account Guarantee Program, or both. 133 FDIC-insured banks and
thrifts, U.S. bank holding companies with an FDIC-insured
subsidiary, and certain U.S. savings and loan holding companies are
123. Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Program, 7 Fed. Reg. 72244, 72244
(Nov. 26, 2008) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 370).
124. Id.
125. Id. at 64,181.
126. Id. at 72,244.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Program, 73 Fed. Reg. at 72,244.
130. Id.
13 1. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 64,181.
considered eligible institutions for both programs. 134 In addition, the
FDIC can designate, after consultation with the appropriate federal
banking agency, affiliates of FDIC-insured depository institutions as
eligible entities for participation in the Debt Guarantee Program. 135
As of October 14, 2008, all eligible institutions are presumed to
be participating in the TLG Program.' 36 These institutions have until
December 5, 2008, to affirmatively opt-out of any part or all of the
TLG Program by notifying the FDIC of its election. 137  If an
institution chooses to participate in the Debt Guarantee Program, the
institution is required to fill out a Master Agreement, which must be
fully executed and submitted to the FDIC within ten business days of
134. Id. Bank holding companies and savings and loan holding companies
must have at least one chartered and operating insured depository institution within
their holding company structure in order to be an "eligible entity" that can
participate in the TLG Program. Id. Additionally, eligible U.S. savings and loan
holding companies must either engage only in permissible activities for bank
holding companies per section (4)(k) of the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956,
or must have at least one FDIC-insured depository institution as of October 13,
2008 that has applied for authority to engage in certain non-banking activities
under Section 4(c)(8) of the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956. Id.
135. Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Program, 73 Fed. Reg. at 64,181. The
FDIC will consider several factors in making this determination such as: "(1) the
extent of the financial activity of the entities within the holding company structure;
(2) the strength, from a ratings perspective, of the issuer of the obligations that will
be guaranteed; and (3) the size and extent of the activities of the organization."
Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Program, 73 Fed. Reg. at 72,244. The same basic
process will apply for any institution that becomes an eligible entity after October
13, 2008. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Temporary Liquidity Guarantee
Program Frequently Asked Questions, Jan. 15, 2009,
http://www.fdic.gov/regulations/resources/TLGP/faq.html [hereinafter TLG
Program FAQ].
136. Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Program, 73 Fed. Reg. at 64,181.
137. Id. at 66,161. Once the choice to opt out or in is made, the decision is
irrevocable. Id. However, an entity that has opted-out can have the option to re-
elect participation in the TLG Program when there is a merger between it and
another eligible entity. TLG Program FAQ, supra note 135, at 21. In addition,
there needs to be conformity with the TLG Program elections between subsidiaries
and their parents. Id. at 22. Specifically, all eligible entities within a U.S. Bank
Holding Company or a U.S. Savings and Loan Holding Company must make the
same participating elections or none of the members of the holding company will
be eligible to participate in that part of the program. Id.
Spring 2009 Congress's First Recipe
234 Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary 29-1
the date the Election Form is completed and submitted. 38 All
participating institutions are also required to publicly disclose to its
potential lenders and creditors the character of the debt it was
offering and whether the debt was guaranteed under the Debt
Guarantee Program. 139 Furthermore, all eligible entities must post a
notice in the lobby of their main office and in all of their branches of
the decision whether to participate in the Transaction Account
Guarantee Program or not. 140
a) Debt Guarantee Program
The Debt Guarantee Program temporarily guarantees all "senior
unsecured debt," up to a certain limit that was issued by a
participating institution between October 14, 2008 and June 30,
2009.141 Under this program, the FDIC wxill guarantee, until June 30,
2012, the unpaid principal and interest of eligible senior unsecured
debt when a participating institution fails to make payment or files
for bankruptcy.'42 Debt that was issued between October 13, 2008
through December 5, 2008 will be considered a "senior unsecured
debt" for the Debt Guarantee Program as long as the debt is
evidenced by a written agreement or trade confirmation, has a
specific and fixed principal, is not subordinate to any other liability,
is non-contingent, and contains no embedded options, forwards,
swaps, or other derivatives. 143 Debt that was issued after December
5. 2008 has an additional requirement in that it must have a stated
maturity of more than 30 days. ' In addition, the FDIC gave non-
138. Id. at 22. No guaranteed debt may be issued after November 21, 2008.
unless the participating institution agrees to be bound by the terms of the Master
Agreement. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Temporart Liquidit
Program: Mlaster Agreement Instructions, at 1 (Nov. 24. 2008), available at
http: xww.fdic.goviregulations resources TLGPimaster.pdf. It is not required for
an institution to fill out the \Master Agreement if they are only participating in the
Transaction Account Guarantee Program. Id.139. Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Program. 73 Fed. Reg. at 79_24.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. TLG Program FAQ. supra note 135, at 10.
144. Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Program. 73 Fed. Reg. at 72.261.
exclusive examples of debt instruments that would be included and
excluded from the Debt Guarantee Program and made a number of
other requirements for debt to be deemed eligible senior unsecured
debt.' 45 For debt issued after December 5, 2008, it also must contain
certain terms that are specified in the Master Agreement. 14
6
There is a limit to how much the FDIC will guarantee through the
Debt Guarantee Program. A participating institution's debt will be
guaranteed up to 125 percent of its senior debt outstanding on
September 30, 2008 as long as it is scheduled to mature before June
30, 2009. 14 If a participating institution has no outstanding debts or
only federal funds purchased on September 30, 2008, then its debt
guarantee limit is two percent of its consolidated total liabilities as of
September 30, 2008.148 Participating institutions cannot label debt as
FDIC-insured when the institution is in excess of its debt guarantee
limit. 149 If an institution issues debt beyond its guaranteed limit, then
its assessment fees will be doubled and this action may make the
institution subject to enforcement actions and civil money penalties,
including the termination of the institution's participation in the Debt
Guarantee Program.' 50
145. TLG Program FAQ, supra note 135, at 11-13. Examples of included debt
instruments are as follows: purchased federal funds, promissory notes, commercial
paper, unsubordinated unsecured notes which includes zero coupon bonds, U.S.
dollar denominated bank deposits in an international banking facility of an insured
depository institution, and U.S. dollar denominated certificates of deposit owed to
certain institutions. Id. at 11. Examples of excluded debt instruments are as
follows: debts that are paired or bundled with other securities, convertible debt,
capital notes, the unsecured portion of otherwise secured debt, negotiable
certificates of deposit, deposits denominated in a foreign currency, retail debt
securities, loans from affiliates, and a few others. Id. Senior unsecured debt may
pay a fixed or floating interest rate based on the Treasury bill rate, the prime rate,
or the LIBOR. Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Program, 73 Fed. Reg. at 72,261.
146. Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Program: Master Agreement, supra note
138.
147. Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Program, 73 Fed. Reg. at 64,182. This
maximum amount will be calculated for each individual participating entity within
a holding company structure. Id.
148. Id. at 72,261. The two percent rule only applies to institutions that are
FDIC insured. Id. If the institution is not FDIC insured, then it must ask the FDIC
to establish a debt guarantee limit for it. Id.
149. TLG Program FAQ, supra note 135, at 17.
150. Id.
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An institution participating in the Debt Guarantee Program is also
required to make certain reports to the FDIC and disclosures to their
potential lenders and investors on each issuance of debt. '5 1 Even if
the institution's senior unsecured debt is zero, every participating
institution must provide the FDIC, by December 5, 2008, the amount
of its senior unsecured debt outstanding as of the close of business on
September 30, 2008 that was scheduled to mature on or before June
30, 2009.152 For every issuance of guaranteed debt after December
5, 2008, the FDIC must be notified of its issuance along with
certification from the institution's Chief Financial Officer or
equivalent that the debt issued does not exceed the participating
institution's debt guaranteed limit. 5 3  In addition, the FDIC must
also be notified in writing within one business day of any payment in
default with respect to any of the participating institution's
indebtedness, regardless of whether or not it is being guaranteed by
the FDIC. 154  Participating institutions also need to specifically
disclose to potential lenders or creditors whether or not any senior
unsecured debt, issued between December 19, 2008 and June 30,
2009, is guaranteed by the TLG Program.' 55
151. Id.
152. Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Program, 12 C.F.R. § 370.3(c)(1)-(2)
(2008).
153. 12 C.F.R. § 370.3(c)(3)-(4).
154. TLG Program FAQ, supra note 135, at 5.
155. 12 C.F.R. § 370.5(h)(2)-(3). The specific statement, which should be
found in all written materials, for FDIC guaranteed debt is:
This debt is guaranteed under the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation's Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Program and is
backed by the full faith and credit of the United States. The
details of the FDIC guarantee are provided in the FDIC's
regulations, 12 C.F.R Part 370, and at the FDIC's Web site,
http://www.fdic.gov/tlgp. The expiration date of the FDIC's
guarantee is the earlier of the maturity date of the debt or June
30, 2012.
12 C.F.R. § 370.5(h)(2). The specific disclosure statement required for non-
FDIC guaranteed debt is: "This debt is not guaranteed under the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation's Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Program." 12 C.F.R. §
370.5 (h)(3).
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b) Transaction Account Guarantee Program
The Transaction Account Guarantee Program provides a
temporary unlimited guarantee of non-interest bearing transaction
accounts at FDIC-insured participating institutions. 156 All "eligible
institutions" 157 are deemed to be participating in this program, and it
is their obligation to affirmatively opt-out of the program by
December 5, 2008.158 This program provides coverage for non-
interest bearing transaction accounts from October 14, 2008 to
December 31, 2009.159 Under the Transaction Account Guarantee
Program, the FDIC will pay the claims of depositors holding non-
interest bearing transaction accounts "as soon as possible" upon the
failure of the institution.1 60  The FDIC will first attempt to pay the
guaranteed amount into an account at another insured depository
institution.16' If an option to make the payment into an account at
another financial institution does not exist, then the FDIC has
expressed that it will "mail a check to the depositor for the full
156. 12 C.F.R. § 370.4(a).
157. The same institutions that are eligible for the Debt Guarantee Program are
also considered eligible institutions for the Transaction Account Guarantee
Program.
158. 12 C.F.R. § 370.5(c).
159. 12 C.F.R. § 370.4(a). "A 'noninterest-bearing transaction account' is
defined as a transaction account with respect to which interest is neither accrued
nor paid and on which the insured depository institution does not reserve the right
to require advance notice of an intended withdrawal." TLG Program FAQ, supra
note 135, at 6. This definition includes demand deposit checking accounts, but
does not include interest bearing money market deposit accounts. Id. Generally,
even though the Transaction Account Guarantee Program only covers non-interest
bearing transaction accounts, the program will also cover two types of interest-
bearing accounts. Id. The program also guarantees negotiable order of withdrawal
accounts (NOW accounts) as long as the interest is 0.50 percent or lower and it will
also guarantee Interest on Lawyers Trust Accounts (IOLTAs) or accounts
functionally equivalent to IOLTAs. Id. Sweep accounts are also generally
excluded from the Transaction Account Guarantee Program. Id. However, funds
that are swept from a non-interest bearing transaction to a non-interest bearing
savings account will be treated as non-interest bearing transaction accounts for
purposes of the Transaction Account Guarantee Program. Id.
160. Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Program, 73 Fed. Reg. at 72,247-48.
161. Id. at 72,247. This is most likely going to be at the acquiring financial
institution. Id.
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amount of the guaranteed account within days of the insured
depository institution's failure."' 162 The FDIC also has the right to
require a depositor to file a proof of claim before making payment
under the Transaction Guarantee Account Program.' 63
To participate in the Transaction Account Guarantee Program,
strict disclosure requirements must be met. Any participating
institution must disclose in the lobby of its main office, in each
domestic branch, and on the institution's website if it offers Internet
deposit services, that the institution is participating in the Transaction
Account Guarantee Program and that its noninterest bearing
transaction accounts are guaranteed in full by the FDIC. 64  If a
company is participating in the TLG Program, but has opted out of
the Transaction Account Guarantee Program, then this information
must also be disclosed in the same fashion as above. 165 The only
other specific disclosures that must be made are when an institution
sweeps, transfers, or reclassifies funds into an account that is not
guaranteed under this program. 66 This disclosure must be made to
all affected customers and must state that this action will void the
FDIC's guarantee under this program. 167
162. Id. at 72,247-48.
163. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(f)(2) (2001).
164 12 C.F.R. § 370.5(h)(4). An example of the type of disclosure that is
required by a participating institution is as follows:
[Institution Name] is participating in the FDIC's Transaction
Account Guarantee Program. Under that program, through
December 31, 2009, all noninterest-bearing transaction accounts
are fully guaranteed by the FDIC for the entire amount in the
account. Coverage under the Transaction Account Guarantee
Program is in addition to and separate from the coverage
available under the FDIC's general deposit insurance rules.
12 C.F.R. § 370.5(h)(4)(i).
165. 12 C.F.R. § 370.5(h)(4). An example of the type of disclosure that is
required by a non-participating institution is as follows: "[Institution Name] has
chosen not to participate in the FDIC's Transaction Account Guarantee Program.
Customers of [Institution Name] with noninterest-bearing transaction accounts will
continue to be insured through December 31, 2009 for up to $250,000 under the
FDIC's general deposit insurance rules." 12 C.F.R. § 370.5(h)(4)(i).
166. 12 C.F.R. § 370.5(h)(4)(ii).
167. Id. This will generally occur when the accounts are swept, transferred, or
reclassified into interest-bearing accounts. Id.
4. Systemically Significant Failing Institutions Program
The Treasury established the SSFI Program as another way to
disperse the funds allocated to the EESA.168 The purpose of the SSFI
Program is to "provide stability and prevent disruption to financial
markets in order to limit the impact on the economy and protect
American jobs, savings, and retirement security from the failure of a
systemically significant institution."' 169  The Treasury fears that the
failure of a systemically significant institution could disrupt financial
markets, raise the borrowing costs for households and businesses,
and reduce the value of homes. 170
Because this program deals with the failure of significant
financial institutions, the SSFI Program will be utilized on a very
limited basis and considered case-by-case. 171  The Treasury is
charged with the responsibility to determine whether an institution is
systematically significant and has a substantial risk of failure by
considering at least four main factors. 172 With the SSFI Program, the
Treasury has the power to determine the form, terms, and conditions
168. U.S. Dep't of Treasury, Guidelines for Systemically Significant Failing
Institutions Program, Jan. 15, 2009, http://www.treas.gov/initiatives/eesa/program-
descriptions/ssfip.shtml [hereinafter Guidelines for SSFI].
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172.
(1)The extent to which the failure of an institution could threaten
the viability of its creditors and counterparties because of their
direct exposures to the institution; (2) [T]he number and size of
financial institutions that are seen by investors or counterparties
as similarly situated to the failing institution, or that would
otherwise be likely to experience indirect contagion effects from
the failure of the institution; (3) [W]hether the institution is
sufficiently important to the nation's financial and economic
system that a disorderly failure would, with a high probability,
cause major disruptions to credit markets or payments and
settlement systems, seriously destabilize key asset prices,
significantly increase uncertainty or losses of confidence thereby
materially weakening overall economic performance; or (4) [T]he
extent and probability of the institution's ability to access
alternative sources of capital and liquidity, whether from the
private sector or other sources of government funds.
Id.
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of any investment made. 73  To help protect the taxpayers' funds
used under the SSFI program, the Treasury will require any
participating institution to provide alternative consideration to
minimize the long-term costs and to maximize the benefits to the
taxpayers. 174  In addition to this alternative consideration,
participating institutions must also comply with restrictions on
executive compensation and corporate governance, which go beyond
those described in the EESA. 1
75
As of February 1, 2009, there has been only one application of
the SSFI Program, with American International Group, Inc. (AIG). 176
Under the SSFI Program, the Treasury purchased $40 billion of
AIG's senior preferred stock and warrants for future common
stock. 17 7  This purchase of stock allows the Federal Reserve to
reduce the total amount of funds made available to AIG under the
previous credit facility established in September of 2008, and allows
the restructure of the terms and conditions associated with that
facility. 178 In addition to receiving the $40 billion from the Treasury,
173. Second Section 105(a) TARP Report, supra note 75, at 4. Any financial
instrument that the Secretary deems to be a "troubled asset," the Treasury may
invest in it after consulting with the Chairman of the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System and giving notice to Congress. Id.
174. Id. at 3.
175. Id. at4.
176. Id. This was publicly announced on November 10, 2008 and was
completed on November 25, 2008. Id. "AIG [was] a large financial services
company that operated in four general business lines through a number of domestic
and foreign subsidiaries: (i) general insurance, (ii) life insurance and retirement
services, (iii) financial services, and (iv) asset management." FSOB First Report,
supra note 71, at 9-10. As of September 30, 2008, AIG had over $1 trillion of
consolidated total assets. Id. at 10.
177. Second Section 105(a) TARP Report, supra note 76, at 4. The Treasury's
preferred stock pays a ten percent cumulative dividend per annum. FSOB First
Report, supra note 71, at 10. AIG is prohibited from paying dividends on its
common stock or any other security unless all accrued dividends on the Treasury's
preferred stock have first been paid. Id. The Treasury also received warrants for
up to two percent of AIG's common stock at an exercise price of $2.50 per share,
subject to anti-dilution provisions. Id. at 10-11.
178. Second Section 105(a) TARP Report, supra note 76, at 4. In order to
prevent AIG from failing, the Federal Reserve "provided AIG with a senior
revolving credit facility in an aggregate amount not to exceed $85 billion at any
time." FSOB First Report, supra note 71, at 10. The term of this credit facility
was for two years. Id. The Treasury's investment, under the SSFI program,
AIG would also benefit from two additional lending facilities that
will be established by the Federal Reserve to help "alleviate capital
and liquidity pressures on AIG associated with its portfolio of
residential mortgage-backed securities and with multi-sector
collateralized debt obligations on which AIG has written credit
default swaps."' 7 9 Along with these benefits, AIG must also cope
with the restrictions on executive compensation that are established
under the EESA, which include the board of directors having to form
a risk management committee for AIG. 180
IV. THE OVERSIGHT OF THE EMERGENCY ECONOMIC STABILIZATION
ACT OF 2008 AND ITS MANY ISSUES
When Congress constructed the EESA, they had the foresight to
understand that this important, complex program was going to need
proper oversight in order to prevent abuses of power, maintain the
goals of the EESA, and to protect the American taxpayer's interest.
The EESA established two different organizations to maintain
general oversight of the TARP. 18 ' These overseeing organizations
are the Financial Stability Oversight Board (FSOB) and the
Congressional Oversight Panel (COP).182 Congress also empowered
two individuals with the general responsibility of auditing the
allowed the Federal Reserve to reduce the maximum amount of credit available to
AIG from $85 billion to $60 billion and allowed for the facility to be extended
another three years. Id.
179. Second Section 105(a) TARP Report, supra note 76, at 4.
180. Id. These are the same limitations that are imposed on financial
institutions who participate in the CPP. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act §
111. The only change to the restriction is that instead of the limitations being
imposed on the SEOs of the financial institution, as described with CPP, the
restrictions on compensation are applied to approximately sixty executives at AIG.
Emergency Economic Stabilization Act § 111. In addition, AIG had "to maintain
and enforce the newly adopted restrictions put in place by the new management on
corporate expenses and lobbying, and must receive the Treasury's written consent
before materially altering these policies." FSOB First Report, supra note 71, at 11.
181. Curtis W. Copeland, Emergency Economic Stabilization Act: Preliminary
Analysis of Oversight Provisions, Congressional Research Service, Nov. 20, 2008,
at 2, available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL34713.pdf [hereinafter
Analysis of Oversight].
182. Id.
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TARP. 183 In order to satisfy the audit needs of the TARP, Congress
established a new Special Inspector General (SIG) for the TARP and
gave additional responsibilities to the Comptroller General of the
United States (CG).1 84 These entities and individuals not only have
to oversee the TARP, but they are also required to submit reports
about their findings. There are a total eighteen different reports that
are required by the EESA. 185  Congress hoped that these actions
would help provide for transparency and for the successful oversight
of the TARP. In Congress's rushed attempt to stabilize the U.S.
financial institutions, however, they enacted the EESA even though
the oversight provisions lacked foresight and completeness.
A. The Financial Stability Oversight Board
1 .The Characteristics of the Financial Stability Oversight Board
The FSOB was established through Section 104 of the EESA in
order to help provide broad oversight of the TARP and to review the
authority exercised by the Secretary. 186  It is composed of five
individual members: (1) the Chairman of the Board of Governors of
the Federal Reserve System; (2) the Secretary of the Treasury; (3) the
Director of the Federal Housing Finance Agency; (4) the Chairman
of the Securities and Exchange Commission, and (5) the Secretary of
Housing and Urban Development. 187  These FSOB members may
183. Id.
184. Id. The Comptroller General of the United States is the head of the
Government Accountability Office. Id. These newly enacted duties are in addition
to the CG's duty to "investigate all matters related to the receipt, disbursement, and
use of the money," and to "evaluate the results of a program or activity the
Government carries out under existing law." 317 U.S.C. §§ 712(1), 717(b) (2007).
185. Curtis W. Copeland, Reporting Requirements in the Emergency Economic
Stabilization Act of 2008, Congressional Research Service, Nov. 13, 2008, at 14-
17, available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/secrecy/RL34740.pdf [hereinafter
Reporting Requirements].
186. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act § 104(a). The EESA established
the FSOB solely with the wording that "[t]here is established the Financial Stability
Oversight Board [...]." Id.
187. Id. at § 104(b)(1)-(5). During an FSOB meeting, if a member of the
board is also serving in an acting capacity of their executive office, they "shall still
serve as a Board member with the same authority and effect as the designated
designate a representative of the same agency to act on behalf of the
FSOB member for any purpose governed in the bylaws, without
giving a reason for the replacement. " 8
With only the Secretary of the Treasury being ineligible, the
FSOB is led by a chairperson who is elected by the members of the
FSOB.'8 9 The Chairperson will not only preside over the FSOB's
meetings, but is also required to provide notice of board meetings to
its board members.190 According to the FSOB amended and restated
bylaws, the first meeting "shall occur no later than the date that is 2
weeks after the first exercise of the Secretary's purchase authority
under the Act, and monthly thereafter."' 9 1 Any board member can
also call for a special meeting after giving written notice to the
chairperson. 192  Board members do not necessarily have to be
physically present to participate or even to vote at an FSOB
meeting.193  It is stated in the Amended and Restated Bylaws that
"[a]ny Board member may participate in a meeting by telephone or
other communications equipment that allows persons participating in
the meeting simultaneously to speak and hear each other." 9 4 There
Board member." Fin. Stability Oversight Bd., Amended and Restated Bylaws, §
B(2), available at http://www.treas.gov/initiatives/eesa/docs/AmendedBylaws.pdf
[hereinafter FSOB Amended and Restated Bylaws].
188. FSOB Amendment and Restated Bylaws, supra note 187, at B3.
However, the representative must be designated in writing and cannot be below the
level of Assistant Secretary or its equivalent. Id. In addition, the representative's
powers to act on behalf of the FSOB member may be restricted if it is specifically
restricted in writing by the FSOB member whom the representative represents. Id.
189. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act § 104(c). The Secretary of the
Treasury is ineligible to be the Chairperson because the FSOB is charged with the
basic duty to review and make recommendations regarding the Treasury's actions.
Emergency Economic Stabilization Act § 104(a),(e). Thus, it would not be proper
for the Secretary of the Treasury to lead the review of his own executive work.
190. FSOB Amendment and Restated Bylaws, supra note 187, at C 1.
191. Id.
192. Id. at C2. The bylaws also state that e-mail will be considered an
acceptable form of written notice. Id.
193. Id. at C3.
194. Id. As long as the FSOB member is participating in a manner that allows
for simultaneous speaking and hearing, then the FSOB member will be deemed
present at the meeting. Id. Board members who are not physically present can still
vote on the issues, but only after the Chairperson has received a form of written
communication stating the Board member's vote. Id. The Amended and Restated
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must be a majority of the FSOB present in order to constitute a
quorum and any decision or determination of the FSOB must be
made by a "majority vote of the voting members." 195
The FSOB is entrusted with four main responsibilities. 96 First, it
must review the Treasury's authority exercised by the Secretary
under any program developed in accordance with Section 101 or
Section 102 of the EESA. 197  Second, the FSOB must make
recommendations to the Secretary regarding the use of the authority
prescribed under the EESA.' 98 Third, the FSOB is required to report
any suspected fraud, misrepresentation, or malfeasance to the SIG or
the Attorney General of the United States. 199 Fourth, the FSOB "has
the authority to ensure that the policies implemented by the Secretary
are in accordance with the purposes of this Act; in the economic
interests of the United States; and consistent with protecting
taxpayers, in accordance with section 113(a) [of the EESA]."20 ° The
Bylaws also state that even though FSOB Board members can participate in the
meetings through a variety of means, the FSOB must still meet in person at least
once a year. Id.
195. FSOB Amendment and Restated Bylaws, supra note 187, at C4. Since the
EESA designates five members to the FSOB, there needs to be at least 3 members
present to constitute a valid quorum. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act §
104(b). Whenever there is not a valid quorum, the Chairperson shall reschedule the
meeting. FSOB Amendment and Restated Bylaws, supra note 187, at C4. Any
voting that takes place regarding the FSOB's decisions and determinations will be
recorded in the minutes. Id. In the event that an FSOB member may have, or may
appear to have, a conflict of interest, then that FSOB member may disqualify
himself or herself from participating in a Board discussion or action. Id. Instead,
the representative of the disqualified FSOB member may act on the matter in the
place of the FSOB member. Id.
196. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act §§ 104(a),(e).
197. Id. at § 104(a)(1). This includes reviewing the policies implemented by
the Secretary and the OFS regarding "the appointment of financial agents, the
designation of asset classes to be purchased, and plans for the structure of vehicles
used to purchase troubled assets..." Id. at § 104(a)(1)(A). In addition, the FSOB
must review "the effect of such actions in assisting American families in preserving
home ownership, stabilizing financial markets, and protecting taxpayers." Id. at §
104(a)(1)(B).
198. Id. at § 104(a)(2).
199. Id. at § 104(a)(3).
200. Id. at § 104(e). Section 113 of the EESA is entitled the "minimization of
long-term costs and maximization of benefits for taxpayers." Id. at § 113. The
basic purpose of the section is to require the Treasury to receive non-voting
FSOB has the additional power to appoint a credit review committee
to evaluate the purchase authority provided under the EESA and the
assets acquired through the exercise of such authority. 201  At least
quarterly, the FSOB must also report on the first three above-listed
responsibilities to the appropriate committees of Congress and the
COG established under the EESA.20 2 The FSOB and its authority
will terminate fifteen days after both "the date the last troubled asset
acquired by the Secretary under Section 101 of the [EESA] has been
sold or transferred out of the ownership or control of the Federal
Government and the date of expiration of the last insurance contract
issued under section 102 of the [EESA]."2 °3
2. Issues Within the Financial Stability Oversight Board
When the FSOB was created by the EESA, it was created with no
other wording than "[t]here is established the Financial Stability
Oversight Board., 20 4  This creates an issue because this language
does not indicate whether the FSOB is part of the executive or
legislative branch of government. Even though there is no express
delegation in the EESA, it can be presumed that the FSOB is an
entity of the executive branch. This is because the EESA specifically
delegates to the five members of the FSOB, and all five of these
FSOB members are from the executive branch. 205 Regardless of this
presumption, the EESA still gives no guidance as to the placement of
the FSOB within the executive branch or another branch.20 6 The
FSOB could be placed within the Department of Treasury, within
warrants from participating financial institutions in order to cover losses, cover
administrative costs, and to allow taxpayers to share in equity appreciation. Id.
201. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act § 104(f).
202. Id. at § 104(g). The responsibilities that must be reported on are
specifically located in EESA Section 104(a)(1). Id.
203. Id. at § 104(h). The 15 day period will begin on the date of the later of
the two events. Id.
204. Id. at § 104(a).
205. Id. at § 104(b). "The Financial Stability Oversight Board shall be
comprised of the Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System; the Secretary [of the Treasury]; the Director of the Federal Housing
Finance Agency; the Chairman of the Securities Exchange Commission; and the
Secretary of Housing and Urban Development." Id.
206. Id. at § 104(a).
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another executive agency, or it could be its own free-standing,
independent entity.2" 7 Based on the Statement and Procedures
Regarding Public Access to Records of the FSOB that was adopted
by the FSOB on December 19, 2008, it seems that the FSOB is its
own free-standing, independent entity.20 8 This statement discloses
that the FSOB "is independent of the Board of Governors and the
other departments and agencies represented on the Oversight
Board. 20 9  It also states that it cannot be implied that "any other
provision of the rules adopted by the Board of Governors, or any
other agency, apply to the [FSOB].,, 2 1°  Thus, the FSOB has
specifically stated that it is independent and not a sub-unit of the
Federal Reserve, the Treasury Department, the Federal Housing
Finance Agency, the Securities and Exchange Commission, or the
Department of Housing and Urban Development. 211 This statement,
however, may not be necessarily accurate because of two different
reasons. First, the FSOB has posted its bylaws, minutes, records
procedures, and reports on the Treasury Department's website rather
than create its own website to disclose information and thus be truly
independent. 212 Secondly, all of the meetings held by the FSOB have
either occurred over the telephone or held at the offices of the
Treasury.213 These two facts help show that even though the FSOB
may desire to be a free-standing, independent entity that is not
subject to any of the rules and policies of its board member's
agencies, the FSOB is not truly acting in a free-standing or
independent manner. The FSOB's actions show that it may be more
207. Analysis of Oversight, supra 181, at 3.
208. Financial Stability Oversight Board, Statement and Procedures
Regarding Public Access to Records, (Dec. 19, 2008), available at
http://www.treas.gov/initiatives/eesa/docs/records-procedures.pdf [hereinafter
FSOB Statement and Procedures].
209. Id. at 2.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. U.S. Dep't of Treasury, Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008,
available at http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/eesa/.
213. Financial Stability Oversight Board, Minutes, (2009) available at
http://www.treas.gov/initiatives/eesa/minutes.shtml [hereinafter FSOB Minutes].
As of February 1, 2009, there have been 7 total meetings held by the FSOB. Id. Of
those seven, five of those meetings have taken place at the offices of the Treasury
Department and two of those meetings have taken place by phone. Id.
accurate for it to be re-characterized as a sub-unit of the Treasury
Department.
There is also a question about the functionality of the FSOB
because there is no way to know when it is required to begin making
reports to the appropriate committees of Congress and the COP. This
is important because without the start date, there is no way to know
when the FSOB is in violation of the EESA for not making the
required reports. Section 104(g) of the EESA and the Amended and
Restated Bylaws of the FSOB states the FSOB shall report on its
duties "not less frequently than quarterly."214 This wording is at least
adequate enough to establish the frequency of reports due, however,
it gives no guidance as to when the FSOB's responsibility to submit
reports begins. There are three possible interpretations for when the
term "quarterly," as used in this section of the EESA, is intended to
begin. First, "quarterly" could mean that the reports are to be issued
every three months starting on the date the EESA was signed into
law.215 Second, it could mean three months from the date that the
Secretary began exercising his authority under the EESA, as is the
benchmark for other things in the EESA. 216 Third, the term could
simply mean that reports need to be issued every three months based
on the fiscal calendar year.217 It seems that the FSOB has interpreted
the term "quarterly" to mean a combination of the first and third
possibilities. 218  The FSOB's first report "covers the period from
October 3, 2009 (the date of enactment of the EESA), through the
quarter ending December 31, 2008 (the "quarterly period")."2 19 This
statement shows that the FSOB intends to issue quarterly reports
based on the calendar year, but chose to begin reporting before the
Secretary exercised any authority under the EESA. This was a wise
interpretation by the FSOB because if the report began on the date
the Secretary began exercising authority under the EESA, then the
214. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act § 104(g); FSOB Amended and
Restated Bylaws, supra note 187, at 3.
215. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1278 (8th ed. 2008); see The White House,
supra note 51 and accompanying text.
216. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1278 (8th ed. 2008); First Tranche Report,
supra note 75, at 2.
217. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1278 (8th ed. 2008).
218. FSOB First Report, supra note 71, at 1.
219. Id.
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report would be missing eleven days of information."': Additionally,
the FSOB's interpretation of "quarterly" will also allow for easy
predictability for the issuance of future reports because it specifies
that the reports will be issued every three months based on the
normal calendar year.
B. The Congressional Oversight Panel
1. The Characteristics of the Congressional Oversight Panel
Congress established another entity to provide broad oversight
over the TARP and over the Secretary's actions under the EESA.
This entity is called the COP and it is specifically established as
being in the legislative branch under Section 125(a) of the EESA. 221
The COP is composed of five members that have to be appointed by
different members of the House of Representatives or by the
Senate. 222 As long as the members of the COP are not members of
Congress or full-time federal officers or employees, then members of
the COP shall be paid at the daily rate of basic pay for level I of the
Executive Schedule for each day that member is performing duties
vested in the COP. 223
220. The EESA was signed into effect by President George W. Bush on
October 3, 2008. The White House, supra note 51. The Secretary first exercised
authority under the EESA on October 14, 2008, when he announced a program
within the TARP to provide capital to eligible financial institutions. Temporary
Liquidity Guarantee Program, 73 Fed. Reg. at 62,205. Thus, there are eleven days
between the two dates.
221. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act § 125(a). The EESA establishes
the COP with the language: "[t]here is hereby established the Congressional
Oversight Panel as an establishment in the legislative branch." Id.
222. Id. at § 125(c). The Speaker of the House of Representatives, the
minority leader of the House of Representatives, the majority leader of the Senate,
and the minority leader of the Senate must each appoint one member to the COP.
Id. at § 125(c)(1)(A)-(D). The last member of the COP is appointed by the Speaker
of the House of Representatives and the majority leader of the Senate, after
consulting with the minority leader of the Senate and the House of Representatives.
Id. at § 125(c)(1)(E). If there is a vacancy on the panel at any time, then the
vacancy will be "filled in the manner in which the original appointment was made."
Id. at § 125 (c)(6).
223. Id. at § 125(c)(2)-(3). When calculating how many days were spent
performing vested duties, the section specifies that any applicable travel time spent
The COP is required to issue two different reports to Congress
conveying the COP's review of the current state of the financial
markets and the regulatory system.224 The first report is entitled a
Regular Report, which must be submitted "no later than 30 days after
the first exercise by the Secretary of the authority under section
101(a) or 102 [of the EESA], and every 30 days thereafter." 225 In the
COP's first Regular Report, the report contained ten multi-part
questions that were first analyzed by the COP, and then a response to
these questions was ordered to be given by the Treasury.2 26 The
second Regular Report included the Treasury's responses to the
COP's ten questions and the COP's evaluation of the Treasury's
responses.227 The second type of report that was required by the
COP was a special report on regulatory reform which the COP had to
should be included. Id. at § 125(c)(2). If a member of the COP is a Member of
Congress or a full-time federal officer or employee, he or she may also not receive
any additional allowances or benefits for their performance on the COP. Id. at §
125(c)(3). For members eligible to be paid for their services on the COP, the
Executive Schedule for Level I established a yearly salary of $196,700 effective
January 2008. U.S. Office of Pers. Mgmt., Exec. Schedule, (2009), available at
http://www.opm.gov/oca/09tables/pdf/ex.pdf [hereinafter Exec. Schedule].
224. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act § 125(b).
225. Id. at § 125(b)(1)(B). The Regular Report must include the COP's review
of the Secretary's use of authority under the EESA, the impact of purchases made
under the ESSA on the financial markets and financial institutions, whether the
information made available on transactions under the program enables market
transparency, the effectiveness of foreclosure mitigation efforts, and the
effectiveness or lack thereof of the EESA to minimize costs and maximize benefits
to the taxpayers. Id. at § 125(b)(1)(A).
226. First COP Report, supra note 83, at 11-32. These questions were formed
as if they were questions which all American have the right to ask. Id. at 6. The
ten basic questions are as follows: (1) What is the Treasury's strategy?; (2) Is the
strategy working to stabilize markets?; (3) Is the strategy helping to reduce
foreclosures?; (4) What have financial institutions done with the Taxpayers' money
received so far?; (5) Is the public receiving a fair deal?; (6) What is the Treasury
doing to help the American family?; (7) Is the Treasury imposing reforms on
financial institutions that are taking taxpayer money?; (8) How is the Treasury
deciding which institutions receive money?; (9) What is the scope of Treasury's
statutory authority?; and (10) Is the Treasury looking ahead? Id. at 8-10. The
COP requested the Treasury to respond to these ten, multi-part questions by
December 30, 2008. 2 Congressional Oversight Panel Rep. App. I (Jan. 9, 2009),
available at http://cop.senate.gov/documents/cop-0 1 0909-report.pdf [hereinafter
Second COP Report].
227. Second COP Report, supra note 226.
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prepare only once and not later than January 20, 2009.228 The EESA
does not require the COP to make either of these reports available to
the public. 22
9
In order for the COP to effectively perform its duties and issue
thorough reports, the EESA granted the COP various powers. 230 The
COP can fulfill its duties with the specific authority to hold hearings,
take testimony, receive evidence, and administer oaths and
affirmations to witnesses. 231 The COP also has the right to obtain
information from any other department or agency of the United
States and to receive seven different reports that are filed by various
agencies in compliance with the EESA.232 Upon authorization from
the COP, any member or agent of the COP is authorized to take
action on behalf of the COP. 233
Congress also foresaw that the COP would need to hire staff to
help fulfill its duties. The EESA allows the COP to appoint and fix
the pay of anyone the COP "considers appropriate." 234 In addition,
the COP is specifically allowed to procure experts, consultants, and
even use employees from any other federal department or agency. 235
The COP is funded through appropriations made by the House of
Representatives and the Senate, and through the reimbursement of its
228. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act § 125(b)(2). This special report's
purpose was for Congress to see how the COP was:
... analyzing the current state of the regulatory system and its
effectiveness at overseeing the participants in the financial
system and protecting consumers, and providing
recommendations for improvement, including recommendations
regarding whether any participants in the financial markets that
are currently outside the regulatory system should become
subject to the regulatory system, the rationale underlying such
recommendation, and whether there are any gaps in existing
consumer protections.
Id.
229. Id. at § 125(b).
230. Id. at § 125(e).
231. Id. at § 125(e)(1).
232. Id. at § 125(e)(3)-(4). The COP can obtain direct information from any
United States department or agency, whenever the Chairperson requests it. Id. at §
125(e)(3).
233. Id. at § 125(e)(2).
234. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act § 125(d)(1).
235. Id. at § 125(d)(2)-(3).
expenses from the Treasury.2 36 The COP will eventually terminate
six months after the authorities provided to the Secretary expire.
237
Unless the Secretary's authority is extended, the COP will be
terminated June 31, 2009.238
2. Issues Within the Congressional Oversight Panel
With one of the COP's duties consisting of dealing with
transparency and asking the Treasury questions which all taxpayers
have a right to ask, it is odd that the COP is not more transparent
about its own operations. The EESA clearly establishes the members
of the COP, how they are appointed, and how to replace a
vacancy.239 Although a chairperson was clearly intended to be
appointed for the COP, the legislature does not indicate how that
chairperson is to be elected.240 This has led to some confusion about
how the current chairperson of the COP, Elizabeth Warren, was
elected.241 As soon as the COP had four members appointed in order
236. Id. at § 125(g). These appropriations are intended to cover what may be
necessary for any fiscal year. Id. The applicable account of the House of
Representatives and the contingent fund of the Senate will equally contribute half
of the appropriations for the COP. Id. The COP can also receive reimbursements
equal to expenses incurred from the Secretary when the Chairperson of the COP
presents the Secretary with a statement of such expenses. Id. at § 125(g)(2). When
this occurs, the Secretary will transfer funds provided under the EESA and send
them to the applicable fund of the House of Representatives and the contingent
fund of the Senate for disbursement. Id.
237. Id. at § 125(f).
238. Id. at § 120(a). Unless extended, the Secretary's authority will expire
December 31, 2009. Id. at § 120(a).
239. Id. at § 125(c)(1), (6).
240. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act § 125. It is clear that there was
congressional intent to install a Chairperson because the Chairperson was given
specific authorities within the COP. Id. at §§ 125(c)(7), 125(e)(3), 125(g)(2).
Unless a majority of the COP members call for a meeting, then the only way for the
COP to have a meeting is "at the call of the Chairperson." Id. at § 125(c)(7).
Furthermore, the COP can only obtain information directly from any department or
agency of the United States with the "request of the Chairperson of the [COP] " Id.
at § 125(e)(3). Lastly, the COP can only be reimbursed for its expenses from the
Secretary "upon the presentment of a statement of such expenses by the
Chairperson of the [FSOB]." Id. at § 125(g)(2).
241. First COP Report, supra note 83, at 2.
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to satisfy their quorum requirement, their first meeting was held
seven days later and the COP chairperson was immediately
elected.242 At this point, the current members of the COP had no
idea who the fifth member of COP was going to be because that
member had not been appointed yet.243 The possibility still existed
that the fifth member appointed to the COP could be more qualified
to be the chairperson and that the vote for chairperson would have
turned out differently if the fifth member had been present. Since
there was a need for the COP to act quickly to comply with its
reporting requirements, it makes sense that the COP had to appoint
someone as the chairperson in order to help coordinate the COP.
This person, however, should have had a temporary role until the
entire panel was established and then there could have been another
vote for chairperson which would include all the members of the
COP.
Additionally, there is no requirement for how often the COP has
to meet, but it is logical to assume the COP would need to meet at
least once a month in order to prepare its Regular Reports that are
due "not later than 30 days after the first exercise by the Secretary of
the authority under section 101(a) or 102 [of the EESA], and every
30 days thereafter."' 244  The Secretary first exercised the authority
under section 101(a) of the EESA on October 28, 2008.245
However, the fact that the EESA merely describes the COP's
reporting requirement as every "30 days," brings up the question as
to whether this should be interpreted as every thirty "calendar" days
or every thirty "business" days.246 Based on the timing of the COP's
242. Id. at 33. The fourth member was appointed to the COP on November 19,
2008 and the COP met for the first time on November 26, 2008. Id.
243. Second COP Report, supra note 226. The fifth member of the COP was
appointed on December 16, 2008. Id.
244. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act § 125(b)(1)(B).
245. First Tranche Report, supra note 75, at 2. The first exercise of authority
was when the Treasury settled purchases under the CPP with eight financial
institutions for a total of $115 billon. Id.
246. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act § 125(b)(1)(B). A calendar day is
defined as "a consecutive 24-hour day running from midnight to midnight."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 424 (8th ed. 2004). The benefit to using a calendar day
system is that it is easy for people to calculate the timing of things, since every day
is counted. In contrast, a business day is defined as "a day that most institutions are
open for business, usually a day on which banks and major stock exchanges are
reports, they seem to be following a mixed approach. The COP
published its first report on December 10, 2008, which was thirty
business days following the date the Secretary first exercised his
authority under the EESA.247 Since the COP elected to report based
off business days for the first report, it would be assumed that they
would maintain the same behavior for the rest of their reporting.
Instead, the COP opted to switch to reporting based on a calendar day
system for its second report and have the third and fourth reports
designated as using the same method.248 The COP probably
manipulated its method for counting the days for the first report
compared to the rest for a number of reasons. First, the COP
probably used the business day method for the first report because it
gave it more time to perform its duties, while still complying with the
reporting requirements established in the EESA.249 Second, after the
open, excluding Saturdays and Sundays." Id. An advantage to using business days
is that it will technically give someone a bigger time frame than a person using
calendar days. However, a major disadvantage is that it is more difficult to
calculate the timing because weekends and holidays are excluded.
247. First COP Report, supra note 83, at 1. If the COP had been following a
calendar day system, then pursuant to Section 125(b)(1)(B) of the EESA the first
report would have been due on November 27, 2008. This would mean that the
COP failed to meet their first reporting requirement by 13 days.
248. See Congressional Oversight Panel, http://cop.senate.gov/index.cfi (last
visited Jan. 18, 2009). The COP complied with the thirty day reporting
requirement when they issued their second report, but they did so using a different
system to count the days. The second report was issued on January 9, 2009, which
is thirty calendar days from the issuance of the COP's first report. COP Second
Report, supra note 226. If the COP had maintained the business day approach, the
second report would not have been due to be issued until January 27, 2009 because
of federal holidays. As of January 2009, the COP still has not issued its third and
fourth reports. However, the COP website discloses the dates which the third and
fourth reports will be issued and these dates follow a calendar day system. See
Congressional Oversight Panel, http://cop.senate.gov/index.cfm (last visited Jan.
18, 2009).
249. The COP finally had enough members to facilitate a quorum and
coordinate its first meeting on November 26, 2008. First COP Report, supra note
83, at 33. If the COP had maintained a calendar day approach for the first report,
then the first report would have been due on the following day. See supra note 248
and accompanying text. This would have led to a weak report that would not have
adequately satisfied the COP's duties because they simply would not have had the
time to do sufficient analysis. By using the business day approach, it allowed the
COP to create a better first report while still complying with their reporting
deadline.
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first report was issued, the COP probably felt it needed to switch to a
calendar day approach so that the reports were less dense and were
issued more frequently. 250 Even though this was a minor
manipulation of the requirements set forth in the EESA, it still
illustrates how easy it is for these agencies to interpret the code in a
manner that is most convenient at that time and a reason why these
agencies need to be more transparent about their decisions.
C. Special Inspector Generalfor the TARP
1.The Characteristics of the Special Inspector General for the TARP
The EESA also established the Office of the Special Inspector
General for the TARP to provide oversight by auditing any program
established under Section 101 or Section 102 of the EESA. 251 The
SIG TARP shall be appointed by the President and confirmed by the
Senate.252 Once the SIG TARP is appointed, the position is not
permanent because the President retains the power to remove the SIG
TARP from office at any time.253 Once the SIG TARP is appointed,
he or she is entitled to a salary that is established in the EESA for
compensation for his or her services.254
250. By using a calendar approach, the report consists of a little more than four
weeks of events to report on. Whereas if the reports were issued using the business
day approach, almost six weeks of events would exist for the COP to report on.
With all the drastic changes in the EESA and the state of the financial markets in
general, the COP most likely felt that their reports needed to be issued more often
to better keep up with the changes in the TARP program.
251. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act §§ 12 1(a), (c).
252. Id. at § 121(b)(1). The SIG TARP shall be appointed "on the basis of
integrity and demonstrated ability in accounting, auditing, financial analysis, law,
management analysis, public administration, or investigations." Id. at § 121(b)(2).
The President is also told to nominate an individual "as soon as practicable" after a
program is established under EESA section 101 or section 102. Id. at § 121(b)(3).
253. Id. at § 121(b)(4). Before the President can remove the SIG TARP from
office, the President must notify Congress in writing for the reason of the removal.
Inspector General Act of 1978 § 1, 5 U.S.C. App. 3 (2007). This notification must
occur at least 30 days before the removal of the SIG TARP. Id.
254. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act § 121(b)(6). This provision
provides that the SIG TARP is entitled to the basic annual pay of an inspector
general under section 3(e) of the Inspector General Act of 1978. Id. According to
the Inspector General Act of 1978, an inspector general's annual salary is that of
The duties that the SIG TARP must perform, in order to receive
compensation, include "conduct[ing], supervis[ing], and
coordinat[ing] audits and investigations of the purchase, [the]
management, and sale of assets by the Secretary of Treasury under
section 101, and the management by the Secretary of any program
established under section 102. "255 The SIG TARP must also collect
and summarize various pieces of information dealing with the TARP
and of any insurance contracts issued under section 102 of the
EESA.256 In addition to the specific duties established in the EESA,
the SIG TARP must also conduct the general duties and
responsibilities of inspector generals described in the Inspector
General Act of 1978.257
The SIG TARP also has the power to carry out his specified
duties by exercising the authorities provided in the Inspector General
Act of 1978.258 In order to assist in the performance of his duties, the
level III of the Executive Schedule plus three percent. Inspector General Act of
1978 § (3)(e). The compensation for someone paid based on level III of the
Executive Schedule in 2009 is $162,900. Executive Schedule, supra note 223. In
accordance with the Inspector General Act, the SIG TARP's yearly salary will be
$167,787, once the income of level III on the Executive Schedule is multiplied by
three percent.
255. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act § 121 (c)(1).
256. Id. at § 121(c)(1)(A)-(G). The SIG TARP needs to provide a description
and listing of the categories of troubled assets purchased by the Secretary, an
explanation of the reasons the Secretary deemed it necessary to purchase each
troubled asset, a listing of each financial institution participating in the TARP, a
listing and detailed biographical information on anyone or any entity hired to
manage troubled assets, an estimate of the total amount of troubled assets
purchased under section 101 of the EESA, the amount of troubled assets on the
books of the Treasury, a listing of any profit and loss incurred on each sale or
disposition of each troubled asset, and a listing of the insurance contracts issued
under section 102 of the EESA. Id. at § 121(c)(1)(A)-(G). As a result, the SIG
TARP's reports include a multitude of topics and will, as a result, require the SIG
TARP to procure employees.
257. Id. at § 121(c)(3). Even though this is outside of the scope of this paper,
the SIG TARP's duties have been amended to include the conducting, supervising,
and coordinating audits and investigations of the auto industry financing and
restructuring. H.R. 384, 11 1th Cong. (2009).
258. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act § 121(d)(1). Thus, the SIG
TARP has the same authority as each inspector general holds as specified in the
Inspector General Act of 1978. It gives the SIG TARP "access to all records,
reports, audits, reviews, documents, papers, recommendations, or other materials
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SIG TARP can hire employees as may be necessary. This authority
to hire includes the SIG TARP being able to enter into contracts and
other arrangements with public agencies and with private persons.259
The SIG TARP can even request information or assistance from any
department, agency, or other entity of the Federal Government. 260 In
the event the SIG TARP believes that information or assistance is
unreasonably refused or not provided, then the SIG TARP must
report the circumstances "to the appropriate committees of Congress
without delay." 261
Within sixty days of taking office and every calendar quarter
thereafter, the SIG TARP must issue a report to the appropriate
committees of Congress and to the COP. 262 Each report shall include
a detailed statement of all purchases, obligations, expenditures, and
revenues associated with any program established by the Secretary
under sections 101 and 102 of the EESA, along with any other
information obtained by the SIG TARP pursuant to his duties.263
The EESA also mandates that certain information found in the SIG
available" to any establishment associated with a program of the EESA. Inspector
General Act of 1978 § 6(a)(1). When needed, the SIG TARP even has the
authority to subpoena the production of any information and administer oaths,
affirmations, or affidavits whenever necessary. Id. at § 6(a)(4)-(5). The duties
assigned to the SIG TARP must also be carried out in accordance with section
4(b)(1) of the Inspector General Act of 1978. Id. at § 4(b)(1). The SIG TARP
must carry out his or her duties while ensuring that they comply with the standards
established by the CG, establish guidelines for determining when it is appropriate
to use non-Federal auditors, and taking the appropriate steps to assure that any
worked performed by a non-Federal auditors meets with the CG's standards. Id.
259. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act § 121(e)(3). These contracts can
be specifically for audits, studies, analyses, and other services that are necessary to
carry out the duties of the SIG TARP. Id.
260. Id. at § 121(e)(4)(A). As long as it does not violate any law, the head of
any entity must give the information or assistance requested by the SIG TARP. Id.
261. Id. at § 121(e)(4)(B).
262. Id. at § 121(f)(l)-(3).
263. Id. at § 121(f)(1). These reports should only include information
regarding the applicable period covered by such report. Id. The Secretary is
required to take action in order to address any deficiencies identified by a SIG
TARP report or investigation. The Special Inspector General for the Troubled
Asset Relief Program Act of 2008, S. 3731, 11 0th Cong. (2008) [hereinafter S.
3731].
TARP's reports are not authorized to be disclosed to the public.
264
As long as the report is not specifically prohibited from being
disclosed to the public, then any report issued by the SIG TARP will
be publicly available on the SIG's website within twenty-four hours
after the final submission of the report.
2 65
The SIG TARP is to be funded with $50,000,000, taken from
funds made available to the Secretary under the EESA, in order to
carry out its duties and make its reports. 2 66 This funding is to remain
available to the SIG TARP until the funds are completely
exhausted.2 67  Eventually, the SIG TARP's office will terminate
either "on the date the last troubled asset acquired by the Secretary
under section 101 [of the EESA] has been sold or transferred out of
the ownership or control of the Federal Government or on the date of
expiration of the last insurance contract issued under section 102 [of
the EESA]. ' 268
2. Issues With the Special Inspector General for the TARP
Even though the EESA was thorough in establishing the Office of
the SIG TARP, the EESA does not indicate where in the government
the office is to be housed. 269  The EESA draws many of the SIG
264. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act § 121(f)(2). This includes
information prohibited from disclosure by any other law, including information that
is protected from disclosure in the interest of national defense or national security
or in the conduct of foreign affairs, and information that is part of an ongoing
criminal investigation. Id. This section specifically prohibits the disclosure of
information from the public. However, there is no provision in the EESA that
requires the SIG TARP to publish any of its reports to the public.
265. S. 3731, supra note 263, at § 5.
266. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act § 121 (g)(1). These funds will be
made available no later than seven days after the SIG TARP is confirmed by the
senate. S. 3731, supra note 263.
267. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act § 121 (g)(2).
268. Id. at § 121(h). The Office of the SIG TARP will terminate on whichever
date occurs later. Id.
269. Id. at § 121(a). "There is hereby established the Office of the Special
Inspector General for the Troubled Asset Relief Program." Emergency Economic
Stabilization Act § 121(a). This is contrary to legislative history where a special
inspector general has been established in Iraq. Emergency Supplemental
Appropriations Act for Defense and for the Reconstruction of Iraq and
Afghanistan, Pub. L. No. 108-106, §3001 (2004). Even though the Act does not
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TARP's duties, powers, pay, and other requirements from the
Inspector General Act of 1978. When inspector generals are
established in the Inspector General Act, they are usually created in
order to conduct and supervise audits and investigations relating to
the programs and operations of "establishments."2 7  Within the
EESA, the TARP is controlled by the Secretary and implemented
through the Office of Financial Stability, which is located as a
subunit of the Treasury. 271 Thus, the program that the SIG TARP is
specifically required to supervise and audit is the TARP; this
program is a product of the Treasury Department, which is also
considered an "establishment" under the Inspector General Act of
1978.272 Even though the Treasury is the only "establishment" to
have more than one inspector general, the TARP program is so
expansive that it would be too much work for Treasury Department's
current inspector general to fulfill the required duties of the EESA.273
This is why the EESA deemed the inspector general for the TARP to
be considered "special" because its duties and authority will end
always specify the organizational placement of the special inspector general, the
Act contains other indications of where the entity was to be housed. Id. at §
3001(b).
270. Inspector General Act of 1978. The term establishment:
. .means the Department of Agriculture, Commerce, Defense,
Education, Energy, Health and Human Services, Housing and
Urban Development, the Interior, Justice, Labor, State,
Transportation, Homeland Security, or the Treasury; the Agency
for International Development, the Community Development
Financial Institutions Fund, the Environmental Protection
Agency, the Federal Emergency Management Agency, the
General Services Administration, the National Aeronautics and
Space Administration, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the
Office of Personnel Management, the Railroad Retirement
Board, the Resolution Trust Corporation, the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation, the Small Business Administration, the
Corporation for National and Community Service, the Veterans
Administration, the Social Security Administration, the Federal
Housing Finance Agency, the Tennessee Valley Authority, the
Export-Import Bank, as the case may be.
Id. at § 12(2).
271. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act § 101 (a)(3)(A).
272. Inspector General Act of 1978, supra note 270 and accompanying text.
273. Id. at § 2(3)(b).
basically with the TARP. Thus, the SIG TARP should be considered
to be within the auspices of the Department of the Treasury.2 74
The SIG TARP is also uniquely different from every other
inspector general. Unlike the inspector generals in other agencies
who must "report to and be under the general supervision of their
agency head," the SIG TARP is not required to report to the head of
any agency. 275 Instead, the SIG TARP will report only to Congress
and not to its own agency head, the Secretary.276 This allows the SIG
TARP to have complete discretion is pursuing audits, investigations,
and in issuing subpoenas.277 The SIG TARP was most likely granted
this unusual power in order to prevent it from being unable to
perform its investigations because of difficult or uncooperative
agency heads. Because the SIG TARP does not report to the head of
its establishment, however, the question is posited as to who is going
to supervise the SIG TARP, its activities, and its use of the
$50,000,000 in funding it has been provided? It would seem that
either Congress or the COP would be the only entities in the position
to provide any effective oversight of the SIG TARP because they are
the only entities that the SIG TARP must report to. Given
Congress's large work load, the COP would be the smart selection to
be in charge of ensuring that the SIG TARP does not over-extend its
authority and that it uses its funds appropriately.
D. Comptroller General
The EESA also entrusted the CG, who is the director of the
Government Accountability Office (GAO), with various oversight
274. Under section 121(d)(1) of the EESA, the SIG TARP has the same
authorities provided to an inspector general in section 6 of the Inspector General
Act of 1978. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act §121(d)(1). This authority
requires the "head of an establishment," which we have already determined the
Office of the SIG TARP is within the Treasury, shall provide adequate office
space, equipment, office supplies, communication facilities, and services that are
necessary for the inspector general. Inspector General Act of 1978 § 6. Thus, with
the Department of Treasury being the "establishment" of the SIG TARP, then the
Department of Treasury must also supply the SIG TARP with adequate office
space, supplies, etc. pursuant to section 6 of the Inspector General Act of 1978. Id.
275. Id. at § 3(a).
276. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act § 121 (f)(1).
277. See supra, notes 255-70 and accompanying text.
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and audit responsibilities for the TARP in order to provide a
legislative278 balance to the TARP's oversight. 27 9 Even though the
GAO is a legislative branch agency, the EESA requires the Secretary
to provide the GAO with appropriate space and facilities within the
Treasury, which is an executive branch agency, in order to perform
its duties and responsibilities governed by the EESA. 280 These duties
can be generally described as: "[to] commence ongoing oversight of
the activities and performance of the TARP and of any agents and
representatives of the TARP, including vehicles established by the
Secretary under the [EESA]. ' 28' The CG is required to submit
278. In 1986, the Supreme Court of the United States determined that the GAO
is a legislative branch agency and cannot have any significant executive branch
functions. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 734 (1986).
279. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act § 116. Congress gave this
legislative branch audit and oversight abilities in order to balance the executive
oversight abilities given to the SIG TARP. Of the four major oversight
mechanisms created by the EESA, the CG is the only mechanism that the EESA
did not have to establish and create.
280. Id. at § 116(a)(2)(A).
281. Id. at § 116(a)(1). There are eight different subjects of oversight that the
CG is responsible for. Id. at § 116(a)(1)(A)-(H). First, the CG must monitor the
performance of the TARP in order to ensure that it is meeting the purposes of the
EESA. Id. at § 1 16(a)(1)(A). Second, the CG must examine the financial
statements and internal controls of the TARP, its representatives and agents. Id. at
§ 116(a)(1)(B). Under the EESA, the TARP must establish and maintain an
effective system of internal controls in order to provide a reasonable assurance of
the effectiveness and efficiency of its operations, the reliability of its financial
reports, and its compliance with applicable laws and regulations. Id. at § 116(c)(1).
Along with the annual financial statements that the TARP must prepare for the
CG's audits, the TARP must also "state the responsibility of management for
establishing and maintaining adequate internal control over financial reporting" and
its assessment of the effectiveness of the TARP's internal control over financial
reporting. Id. at § 116(c)(1). The CG provides the only oversight mechanism that
is actually given the responsibility to monitor the internal controls of the TARP.
Third, the CG must analyze the details of the characteristics of transactions and
commitments entered into to purchase assets. Id. at § I 16(a)(1)(C). Fourth, the CG
has the responsibility to review the characteristics and dispositions of acquired
assets and the use of the proceeds from their sales. Id. at § 1 16(a)(1)(D). Fifth, the
CG must provide oversight for the efficient use of appropriated funds for the
operation of the TARP. Id. at § 116(a)(1)(E). Sixth, the CG must make sure that
the TARP, its agents, and its representatives comply with all applicable laws and
regulations. Id. at § 116(a)(1)(F). Seventh, the CG is the only oversight entity that
must review the TARP's efforts to minimize conflicts of interest. Id. at §
reports, at least every sixty days, to the COP and the SIG TARP
relating to the CG's oversight of the activities and the performance of
the TARP.282 In addition, the CG must annually prepare audited
financial statements of the TARP that are prepared in accordance
with generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP).283 Whenever
the CG's audit discovers a problem, the TARP must respond by
taking action to address the deficiency or certify to the appropriate
committees of Congress that no action is necessary or appropriate. 284
In performing its oversight or audit responsibilities of the TARP, the
CG has access to any information, items, or property belonging to or
in use by the TARP.285 This allows the CG to obtain any and all
information pertaining to the TARP so that it may reliably perform
its responsibilities. Nevertheless, the CG's oversight, reporting, and
audit responsibilities will eventually terminate on the later of the date
the last troubled asset acquired under Section 101 of the EESA has
been sold or transferred out of the control or ownership of the federal
1 16(a)(1)(G). Eighth, the CG must examine the TARP's efficacy of contracting
procedures in evaluating proposals for the inclusion and contracting to the
maximum extent possible of minorities, women, and minority or women owned
businesses. Id. at § 116(a)(1)(H). This is another unique responsibility of the CG,
which no other oversight entity is entrusted with. Any cost associated with
performing these oversight duties will be reimbursed by the Department of
Treasury. Id. at § 116(a)(2)(C).
282. Id. at § 116(a)(3). The CG may also submit special reports to the same
oversight entities as warranted by the findings of its oversight activities. Id.
283. Id. at § 116(b). The CG has the authority to "audit the programs,
activities, receipts, expenditures, and financial transactions of the TARP and any
agents and representatives of the TARP, including vehicles established by the
Secretary under [the EESA]." Id. at § 1 16(b)(2). Any expenses incurred by the CG
for performing any such audit will be reimbursed by the Department of Treasury.
Id. at § 116(b)(1).
284. Id. at § 116(b)(3).
285. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act § 116(a)(2)(B). The CG
specifically has access "to any information, data, schedules, books, accounts,
financial records, reports, files, electronic communications, or other papers, files, or
property belonging to or in use by the TARP." Id. The CG can request any of this
information from any vehicle established by the Secretary under the EESA, anyone
who performs activities on behalf of or under the authority of the TARP, or even
from any vehicle as the CG requests. Id. In addition, the CG also has the authority
to make and retain copies of anything as the CG deems appropriate. Id.
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government, or on the date the last insurance contract under Section
286102 of the EESA expires.
V. EVEN WITH THE PROVIDED OVERSIGHT, THERE ARE STILL MANY
ISSUES REGARDING THE EMERGENCY ECONOMIC STABILIZATION ACT
OF 2008 AND ITS PROGRAMS
Through the EESA, Congress has committed $700 billion of
taxpayers' money for the TARP's spending.287 Congress attempted
to create adequate safeguards to ensure the taxpayers' money was
being spent prudently and solely for the purposes stated in the EESA.
These safeguards were intended to be established by the various
oversight entities which have the duty to monitor, review, and report
on the operations of the Secretary and of the TARP. However, these
safeguards seem to be incomplete.
When individuals ask for money from banks, they are required to
disclose how the money will be spent before receiving the money -
banks should have the same disclosure requirement before receiving
taxpayer money. With $700 billion being spent, the public deserves
for the TARP to be transparent enough so they feel comfortable with
the manner in which their taxpayer dollars are being allocated. The
intended purpose of the CPP is stated as being "to encourage U.S.
financial institutions to build capital to increase the flow of financing
to U.S. businesses and consumers and to support the U.S.
economy., 288 As of January 30, 2009, over $195 billion dollars has
been spent between 361 different financial institutions through the
CPP program alone. 28 9 Congress has hoped that this huge influx of
money would lift financial pressures off these financial institutions,
and as a consequence, help restore confidence in America's financial
286. Id. at § 116(e). However, unless the date is extended, the Secretary is
only required to provide the CG with space and facilities until December 31, 2009.
Id. at §§ 116(e), 120(a).
287. Id. at § 115(a).
288. U.S. Dep't of Treasury, Guidelines for Capital Purchase Program, Jan. 2,
2009, http://www.treas.gov/initiatives/eesa/program-descriptions/cpp.shtml
[hereinafter Guidelines for CPP].
289. Office of Financial Stability, Troubled Asset Relief Program:
Transactions Report, Feb. 2, 2009,
http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/eesa/docs/transaction-report_02-02-09.pdf
[hereinafter TARP Transactions Report].
sector. This desired confidence, however, was unattainable once
taxpayers learned on December 21, 2008, that the first 116 banks
participating in the CPP had awarded their top executives nearly $1.6
billion in salaries, bonuses, and other benefits in 2007.290 This has
understandably caused concern in taxpayers' eyes because these
executives were receiving huge compensations while their financial
institutions crumbled, requiring federal funds to fix their mistakes.29'
These examples of excessive spending make taxpayers wonder how
the CPP funds will be used; will the funds be used to help stabilize
the financial market and increase lending or will they be used to
excessively compensate its executives as was done in 2007?292
290. Associated Press, $1.6B of Bank Bailout Went to Execs, CBS News, Dec.
21, 2008
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2008/12/21/business/main4680508.shtml. The
Associated Press issued a report giving the details of the executives' compensation.
Id. Some of the benefits included "cash bonuses, stock options, personal use of
company jets and chauffeurs, home security, country club memberships and
professional money management." Id. Goldman Sachs incurred costs of up to
$233,000 per executive for cars and drivers. Id. In 2007, the Chairman of
JPMorgan Chase spent $211,182 on private jet travel when his family lived in
Chicago and he was commuting to New York. Id.
291. Id. The compensation to executives at such financial institutions as
Goldman Sachs Group Inc. (Goldman Sachs), Capital One Financial Corp (Capital
One), and Merrill Lynch & Co. (Merrill Lynch) leave taxpayers and investors
uneasy about the stability of the financial market. In 2007, Goldman Sachs paid its
top five executives a total of $242 million in compensation. Id. Then, in 2008,
Goldman Sachs was among the first eight financial institutions to receive federal
money totaling $10 billion. CPP TARP Transaction Report, supra note 289.
Capital One was also financially forced to participate in the CPP program on
November 21, 2008, for $3.56 billion. Id. With Capital One having a
disappointing year in 2008, its chairman took a $1 million decrease in
compensation. $1.6B of Bank Bailout Went to Execs., supra note 290. This
seemed very noble of the chairman, however, he still received $17 million in stock
options. Id. The CEO of Merrill Lynch also earned more than a total of $83
million in 2007. Id. Merrill Lynch was also a part of the first financial institutions
to receive aid from the government. Id. Even though Merrill Lynch received $10
billion from the CPP, it was still sold and subsequently merged with Bank of
America. Id.
292. Second COP Report, supra note 226, at 3. "So long as investors and
customers are uncertain about how taxpayer funds are being used, they question
both the health and the sound management of all financial institutions." Id.
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The Associated Press conducted a survey of twenty-one banks,
which received at least $1 billion in government bailout money. 293
This survey asked four questions about the money received by the
financial institution from the government and all of the twenty-one
banks either declined to comment or did not provide specific
answers. 294 This is an example of a major problem with the TARP
and why investors still do not have confidence in the United States'
financial market. Financial institutions that participate in the CPP
have no stated requirement to use the government CPP funds in any
particular way. 295 Even if there was such a requirement, there is still
nothing in the EESA or in the Securities Purchase Agreement
attached to the CPP that requires a financial institution to disclose, to
the public or even to the government, how the funds are actually
being spent. 296  This lack of transparency of how the financial
institutions are using their bailout funds concerns everyone because
for all we know the financial institutions are using the government
funds for salaries, bonuses, issuing dividends, or even to buy out
other banks, instead of using the money to stabilize the larger
financial market and increase lending.
The EESA provides for four major oversight entities to help
ensure that the Secretary and the TARP would be transparent to the
public, but it obviously fell short in regard to how financial
institutions used the TARP funds because no government agency or
public person has any idea how the money is being spent. The COP
has the power to request official data in order to carry out its duties,
but this power is limited to only departments and agencies of the
United States.297 The COP, however, does have the power to "hold
293. Associated Press, Banks Won't Give Specifics On Bailout Spending, CBS
5, (December 22, 2008) http://cbs5.com/national/bailout.banks.us.2.892674.html.
294. Id. The four questions regarding the government money were: (1) How
much has been spent?; (2) What was it spent on?; (3) How much is being held in
savings?; and (4) What is the plan for the rest? Id.
295. Instead, financial institutions are merely supposed to build their capital to
increase the flow of financing. Guidelines for CPP, supra note 288.
296. Matt Apuzzo, Where'd the bailout money go? Banks Aren't Saying, USA
TODAY, (Dec. 26, 2008)
http://www.usatoday.com/money/industries/banking/2008-12-22-bailout-money-
whereN.htm?csp=34.
297. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act § 125(e)(3). Even if the COP
requested statements from the SEC or IRS regarding the financial institutions, this
hearings, take testimony, and receive evidence as the [COP]
considers appropriate and may administer oaths or affirmations to
witnesses appearing before it."298 If the COP uses this power to hold
hearings to gain testimony and evidence from a financial institution,
it will only force the witness to disclose if they know how the
government money was being spent.2 99 This process would not only
take a lot of time and use more of the taxpayers' money, but it still
would not force the financial institutions to keep records of how they
used the bailout funds.
In order to ensure the taxpayer's money is being diligently spent
to restore stability to the financial market and ensure lending to
taxpayers and businesses, amendments or chanegs need to be made to
the EESA. The combination of five different amendments or
changes to the EESA and its programs, such as the CPP, could help
ensure the goals that Congress and the Secretary had originally
envisioned in creating the EESA are met. The first of these
amendments should state that when any financial institutions receives
funding from the TARP and has preferred stock under the control of
the Federal Government, then these financial institutions should be
forced to restrict the compensation to their executives. 300 Under the
EESA, financial institutions participating in TARP had certain
restrictions on their executive compensation, but it did not specify a
limit to that compensation nor was there any regulation on luxury
expenditures. 30 1 The Treasury, however, noticed this deficiency and
still would not provide the COP with enough information to decipher how the
government funds were being used.
298. Id. at § 125(e)(1).
299. The chairperson of the COP explained that, "[iff the appropriate
restrictions were put on the money to begin with, if the appropriate transparency
was in place, then we wouldn't be in a position where you're trying to call every
recipient and get the basic information that should already be in public documents."
Apuzzo, supra note 296.
300. As the AP review of the executives of financial institutions receiving
bailout money shows, these executives were awarded huge annual salaries,
bonuses, and additional compensations and the following year their financial
institution required government funds to stay alive. $1.6B of Bank Bailout Went to
Execs., supra note 290. Any money paid through the TARP should not be used to
compensate executives who did a poor job of running their financial institutions.
Furthermore, it should not be the taxpayers' responsibility to pay these executives'
exorbitant compensation.
301. See supra notes 100-14 and accompanying text.
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on February 4, 2009, the Treasury issued guidelines that are
"designed to ensure that the compensation of top executives in the
financial community is closely aligned not only with the interests of
shareholders and financial institutions, but with the taxpayers
providing assistance to those companies. 30 2
The Guidelines impose new compliance requirements of
executive compensation on all companies that have received or are
going to receive any form of government assistance. 30 3 In addition,
the Guidelines place increased restrictive conditions on the executive
compensation depending on whether the financial institution
receiving federal assistance is participating in a "generally available
capital access program" or is receiving "exceptional financial
recovery assistance." 30 4 For financial institutions participating in a
generally available capital asset program, their senior executives are
limited to $500,000 in total annual compensation,30 5 the twenty-five
302. U.S. Dep't of Treasury, Treasury Announces New Restrictions on
Executive Comp, TG- 15 (Feb. 4, 2009), available at
http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/tgl5.htm [hereinafter New Restriction on
Executive Comp.].
303. Id. This guideline requires the chief executive officer of the financial
institution to annually certify that the company has strictly complied with
"statutory, Treasury, and contractual executive compensation restrictions." Id.
This certification will hold chief executive officers personally liable if there is a
deficiency in complying with the executive compensation requirements.
Additionally, such companies must have their compensation committee "provide an
explanation of how their senior executive compensation arrangements do not
encourage excessive and unnecessary risk-taking." Id.
304. Id. The qualities of "generally available capital access program" are that
all the recipients have the same terms, there are limits as to how much each
institution may receive from the program, and there are specified returns for
taxpayers. Id. An example of a generally available capital access program is the
CPP. Id. Financial institutions that are in need of more assistance than is allowed
under a widely available standardized program are distinguished as requiring
"exceptional assistance." Id. These financial institutions have "bank-specific
negotiated agreements with Treasury." Id. Examples of financial institutions that
require "exceptional assistance" are AIG, under the SSFI, and Citigroup Inc. or
Bank of America Corporation, under the Targeted Investment Program. Id.
305. Id. The $500,000 limit to total annual compensation includes the value of
restricted stock. Id. However, this limit to senior executives' compensation can be
waived upon the full disclosure of their compensation and, if requested, a non-
binding "say on pay" shareholder resolution. Id. In addition to the limit on
compensation, these financial institutions must still review and disclose why the
highest paid senior executives are subjected to claw-back provisions
of their bonuses and incentive compensation,3"6 the top five senior
executives are limited to a golden parachute payment no greater than
one year's compensation, 30 7 and there are new policy requirements
for luxury expenditures.30 8 The Guidelines also establish executive
compensation restrictions on companies receiving exceptional
financial recovery assistance which are similar to, but more
restrictive than, the guidelines set in place for companies
participating in generally available capital access programs.
30 9
Financial institutions receiving exceptional financial recovery
assistance must limit their senior executives' total annual
compensation agreements of the senior executives and of the other employees do
not encourage excessive risk taking. Id.
306. Id. The top 25 senior executives are subject to having their bonuses and
incentive compensation clawed-back "if they are found to have knowingly engaged
in providing inaccurate information relating to financial statement or performance
metrics used to calculate their own incentive pay." Id. This same guideline also
applies to companies receiving exceptional financial recovery assistance. Id.
Under the CPP, only the top five senior executives were subject to such a claw-
back provision. Id.
307. New Restriction on Executive Comp., supra note 302. After one of the
top five senior executives is severed from employment, they will not be allowed a
golden parachute payment greater than one year's compensation. Id. This would
seem to severely restrict golden parachute payments, but by using the term "one
year's compensation" it allows golden parachutes to include salary, bonuses, and
stock when calculating a senior executive's compensation. By limiting golden
parachutes to one year's compensation, people like John Thain, Chief Executive
Officer of Merrill Lynch, can still take advantage of the system exhibited through
his $83 million in total compensation in 2007, which consisted of $57,692 in
salary, $15 million in signing bonus, and an additional $68 million in stock options.
Apuzzo, $1.6B of Bank Bailout Went to Execs., supra note 290.
308. New Restrictions on Executive Comp., supra note 302. The board of
directors must create, adopt, and publicly disclose a company-wide policy dealing
with expenditures relating "to aviation services, office and facility renovations,
entertainment and holiday parties, and conferences and events." Id. This
company-wide policy is to deal with luxury expenditures and not the reasonable
expenditures tied to normal business operations. Id. Whenever there is an
expenditure that could be viewed as excessive or luxury items, then the chief
executive officer must certify that the expense is within the company policy or is a
reasonable expenditure tied to normal business operations. Id.
309. Id.
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compensation to $500,000 not including restricted stock,3 1 have a
non-binding shareholder resolution to approve the senior executive
compensation structure, 31 1 subject the twenty-five highest paid senior
executives to provisions that can claw-back their bonuses and
incentive compensation, 3 12 expand restrictions on golden parachutes
for senior executives, 313 and adopt new policy requirements for
luxury expenditures. 314  These guidelines were well "designed to
ensure that public funds are directed only toward the public interest
in strengthening our economy by stabilizing our financial system and
not toward inappropriate private gain." 31 5 However, there are still
issues with the Guidelines that will have to be eventually addressed.
First of all, guidance documents, such as the Guidelines, are not
legally binding on the public, the agency, or the courts. 316 Secondly,
even if the Guidelines were legally binding, they would only apply to
institutions that accept new or additional government funding that
310. Id. The senior executive's compensation limit of $500,000 in total
compensation does not include compensation in the form of restricted stock. Id.
This allows senior executives to be paid more than the $500,000 with restricted
stock that can only be cashed in after the government has been completely repaid,
including dividends, or "after a specified period according to conditions that
consider among other factors the degree a company has satisfied its repayment
obligations, protected taxpayer interests or met lending and stability standards." Id.
By allowing a senior executive to gain this restricted stock, it helps ensure that the
financial institution's "incentives [are] aligned with both the long-term interests of
shareholders as well as minimizing the costs to taxpayers." Id.
311. Id. This "say on pay" provision gives the stockholders the power to
understand and authorize the executive compensation structure and how the
compensation is tied to sound risk management. Id.
312. Id. This guideline is the same as the claw-back requirement for financial
institutions participating in generally available capital access programs. Id.
313. Id. The top five senior executives are denied the receipt of any golden
parachute payments whatsoever. Id. In addition, at least the next twenty five
executives are prohibited from receiving any golden parachute payment greater
than one year's compensation. Id. Again, this still leaves the option open for these
executives to include their salary, bonuses, and stock when calculating their one
year's compensation. Id.
314. New Restrictions on Executive Comp., supra note 302. This guideline is
the same as the luxury expenditure policy requirement for financial institutions
participating in generally available capital access programs. Id.
315. Id.
316. KEITH WERHAN, PRINCIPLES OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, 253 (Thomas
West 2008).
constitutes either exceptional financial recovery assistance or is made
through a generally available capital access program.' 7 "These new
standards will not apply retroactively to existing investments or to
programs already announced. ' ' 318 This means the Guidelines will not
apply to the 361 financial institutions already participating in the CPP
or the other three financial institutions that would be considered
receiving exceptional financial recovery assistance because all of
these contracts took place before the Guidelines were established on
February 4, 2009. 3 9 The only way the Guidelines could apply to one
of these pre-Februaty 4, 2009, financial institutions would be if they
had to come back to the government and ask for more money.
Otherwise, the Guidelines only apply to post-February 4. 2009,
TARP participating financial institutions. This could create a
problem because the government would be holding similarly situated
financial institutions to two different standards and it would not
317. New Restrictions on Executive Comp., supra note 302.
318. Id. In the case of Bowen v. Gcorgetoiin Lniversite Hospital, the Court
held that the Department of Health and Human Ser\ ices could not retroactively
recalculate Medicare reimbursements due to hospitals for 1981 and 1982 based on
a regulation promulgated in 1984. Bowen v. Georgetowvn Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S.
204, 206-08; 216 (1988). The Supreme Court of the United States reasoned that
achninistrative agencies generally do not ha\ e the pow er "to promulgate retroactive
riles unless that power is conveyed by Congress in express terms." Id. at 208.
Even if there is substantial justification for there to be retroactive rulemaking, the
courts will be reluctant to find such authority absent an express statutory grant. Id.
at 208-09. So even though there is ample justification in retroactively
implementing a law that limits a financial institution's, participating in the TARP,
executive compensation, Congress does not expressly grant the Secretary the power
to do this. Under the EESA, the Secretary does have the authority to retroactively
recover bonuses or incentive compensation paid to senior executives based on
criteria proven materially inaccurate. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act §
11 l(b)(2)(B). However, this retroactive provisions deals only vith bonuses and
incentix e compensation in a specific fact pattern and does not expressly state the
Secretary has the po\er to retroactively limit a TARP participating financial
institution's executive compensation. Id. Thus, the Secretary cannot implement
the Guidelines to apply retroactively.
319. TARP Transaction Report: Treasury .4nnounces \ew Restrictions on
Executive Compensation. This is a shame because a majority of the financial
institutions have already been granted or denied participation in the TARP.
Granted there are still more applications being considered after February 4, 2009,
but the numbers will be dramnatically less compared to the first couple months
directly following the introduction of the TARP
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necessarily be fair.320 The only way to enforce the Guidelines on all
financial institutions, equally and retroactively, would be if Congress
created an Act that imposed regulatory reform on financial
institutions.32'
Regulatory reform is an extremely feasible possibility in the near
future.322 The Guidelines already propose some regulatory reforms
dealing with executive compensation and the Secretary is hosting a
conference with various parties to specifically discuss an executive
pay reform of financial institutions. 323  Regardless of when a
financial institution entered into contract dealing with the TARP,
Congress could enact a provision that limits the executive
compensation of all financial institutions, removing issues of
retroactively changing the financial institutions' TARP agreements
with the government. This type of reform, however, would not only
limit the executive compensation of troubled financial institutions,
but it would also limit the executive compensation of financial
institutions that managed to be successful and did not require TARP
320. Furthermore, the Guidelines are only voluntary "standards" that carry no
real authority until the situation exists when an applicable financial institution does
not follow the Guidelines, the Treasury takes the financial institution to court, and
the judicial courts decide their application and legality. The only other way that the
Guidelines can be given the legal authority for the Treasury to enforce would be if
Congress passed a bill containing the provisions.
321. Courts can enact retroactive statutes. See, e.g., Pension Benefit Guarantee
Corp. v. R.A. Gray & Co., 467 U.S. 717 (1984); Welch v. Henry, 305 U.S. 134
(1938).
322. The restrictions under the Guidelines have been added to the stimulus bill
that is currently under consideration in the Senate. H.R. 337, llth Session (1st
Session 2009).
323. New Restrictions on Executive Comp., supra note 302. The Guidelines
proposed that all public financial institutions must establish a compensation
committee to review and disclose strategies for aligning compensation with sound
risk management and long-term value creation for their companies and their
shareholders. Id. Another proposal the Guidelines described was to encourage top
executives to focus more on the long-term economic interests of the finn by
requiring the top executives to hold stock for several years after it is awarded and
before it can be cashed out. Id. The Guidelines also proposed that since the
shareholders are the owners of the financial institutions, they "should have a non-
binding resolution on both the levels of executive compensation as well as how the
structure of compensation incentives helps promote risk management and long-
term value creation for the firm and the economy as a whole." Id.
funds.324 Thus, it will be interesting to see what actions Congress
chooses to take regarding the reform of the financial institutions'
executive compensation and when, or if, these regulatory reforms
will take place.
Even with regulatory reform on executive compensation, it will
still not be enough to restore taxpayers' and investors' confidence in
the financial market of the United States because there is still no
accountability nor disclosure of how government funds are being
used. The lack of any accountability of TARP funds obtained through
the CPP may make it too late to monitor financial institutions' use of
the first $195,328,219. However, the Secretary can amend the CPP
to fix these issues before the rest of the TARP funds are disbursed.
The second recommended amendment to the EESA should state
that any entity receiving government funding from participating in a
TARP should have to account for how the taxpayers' funds are being
used to further the applicable goals, such as stabilizing the financial
market and increasing lending, and ensure the funds are not being
used for the institution's self-interest. Beginning when a financial
institution receives government funding, it should have to prepare a
separate financial statement that shows at least four basic items.
First, it should disclose how much money the financial institution
received from the TARP program. Second, it should account for how
much bailout money was spent, when it was spent, and for what.
Third, the financial statement should reveal how much of the TARP
money is being stored in the financial institution's savings account or
capital account. Fourth, it should reveal how much of the
government money is being used to further the governmental
program's goals and from where the financial institution received its
funds. By requiring financial institutions to maintain financial
statements that can address at least these four questions, it will force
324. This may not be considered a fair enactment because it would limit the
compensation from executives who perform well and rightfully deserve their
salary. These successful executives should not be limited to the same
compensation as executives of unsuccessful financial institutions. This reform, in
the long run, could ultimately cause the executives of financial institutions to not
perform their duties to the best of their abilities because they will have no monetary
incentive to further the success of the institution. Thus, this lack of motivation by
the executives could cause for the downfall of financial market again and require
the government to again intervene to stabilize the situation.
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the financial institutions to maintain an accurate accounting of their
government acquired funds.
Another recommended change to the EESA needs to address the
lack of public transparency. Even with an accurate accounting of a
financial institution's use of TARP funds, there still needs to be
better transparency so that taxpayers can be confident their money is
being used for the proper purposes. Transparency can be
dramatically increased if the financial institutions were required to
issue a financial statement, dealing with the use of its government
allocated funds, every thirty days or on a similar time period. 325
These reports would need to be fully disclosed to the public because
the public should have the right to know how their taxpayer dollars
are being spent.3 26 Financial institutions should also be required to
send these reports to the COP and to the SIG TARP in order to
ensure proper oversight.327 By requiring financial institutions to
account for and disclose the use of TARP funds, the Secretary could
help bring confidence and transparency back to the United States'
financial markets.
The fourth needed change to the EESA needs to establish some
form of consequences for institutions that do not adhere to the
provisions of the EESA and its programs. Besides the TARP
allowing the claw-back of bonuses and incentive compensation 328
and yearly certification requirements that is imposed by the CPP,
325. Having the financial institutions issue reports every thirty days will force
them to not fall behind in the accounting of their use of bailout funds. The other
advantage to having a short reporting period is that it will be easier for oversight to
prevent the misallocation of funds because the reports will allow for better
oversight tracking of the funds.
326. With the easy accessibility of information on the Internet, financial
institutions should be able to post these financial statements for the public on
company website.
327. The COP would use these financial reports to measure the impact of the
purchases made under the TARP on the financial markets and on the financial
institutions. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act § 125(b)(2). The SIG TARP
could exercise its authority over the financial statements to conduct, supervise and
coordinate audits of the management of the assets under any program established
through section 101 or section 102 of the EESA. Id. at § 121(c)(1). Under this
provision, the SIG TARP would be managing the government's stock in the
financial institution by auditing the institution's use of the TARP funds. IA.
328. Id. at § 121(b)(2)(B).
which could make the signatory liable for fraud,329 there are no
general consequences to the financial institutions that do not uphold
the laws of the TARP and its programs. This is not fair to the
taxpayers because there are no provisions to compel the financial
institutions' compliance with the TARP. If the roles were reversed
and it were the financial institutions lending the money to the
government, then there would have been definite consequences that
the government would have to pay if they did not comply with the
contract.33° The same type of enforcement procedure should be used
by the government in order to create incentives to follow the
provisions in the TARP.
Thus far, the majority of financial institutions that participate in
the TARP have traded shares of preferred stock and warrants for
common stock in exchange for receiving bailout funds.33' While the
government holds the preferred stock, the stock pays a five percent
cumulative dividend for the first five years and is increased to nine
percent thereafter. 332 This is where the consequences for a financial
institution for not adhering to the TARP should take effect. I would
propose that at the time a report is due by a financial institution, if
there are any deficiencies with the compliance of the TARP or any of
its future amendments, then there would be a permanent three percent
increase of the cumulative dividend due to the government's
preferred stock. This provision would be subject to a waiver if the
financial institution believes and proves its actions did not violate the
329. TARP Capital Purchase Program, supra note 105 and accompanying
text.
330. If a bank was issuing money to an individual, a business, or even the
government, then the party requesting the funds would have to comply with all of
the bank's requirements. The banks would make the party disclose, among other
things, their financial status and assets that can be used for collateral. Then, the
bank would require the party to certify to the truth of the disclosure along with
certain ramifications if the disclosures are found to be false. Afterwards, the bank
would create a contract for the bank to release the funds to the party. This contract
would not only grant funds to the party, but it would also impose strict
consequences in the event the party does not fully comply with the terms of the
contract. It is this sort of provision that banks use to help ensure compliance with
its terms, and this is the same type of provision that should be used by the
govermment to help guarantee financial institutions uphold the provisions laid out
in the TARP and its future amendments.
331. TARP Transactions Report, supra note 289.
332. CPP Term Sheet, supra note 85.
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TARP provisions. Imposing this form of monetary consequence on
financial institutions would be an option for the government, but the
question still remains whether this form of consequence could be
imposed on financial institutions already participating in the
TARP.333
There are two methods that could be used to implement the
enforcement of such consequences on financial institutions that are
currently participating in the TARP and on those that may participate
in the future. The first method would allow Congress to dictate the
terms of the consequences for violating the TARP in an act that
amends the TARP. Under this method, Congress could apply the
consequences to any financial institution violating the TARP and
could even retroactively apply the consequences for gross violations
of the TARP. A possible disadvantage to allowing Congress to enact
the provision is that there is no telling how long it could take to be
approved by the Senate, the House of Representatives, and the
President.
An alternative method would require the Secretary to exercise his
or her authority under the EESA to create this new "rule." 334  In
333. This form of consequence would punish financial institutions, and not
necessarily its executives, for not respecting the taxpayers' money by neglecting
the terms of their contracts and of the TARP. In addition, taxpayers will benefit
from this because more money will be made on the capital investment. This is
more preferable than the government rescinding the agreements with the financial
institutions and recovering the capital that was invested. First of all, it cannot be
guaranteed that the government could even reacquire its capital investment because
the financial institution may have already used all the funds. If the government
could successfully recover their investment, it would be contrary to a purpose of
the EESA of stabilizing the financial market because the financial institution will
undoubtedly fail without the government assistance. If the government could not
recover its investment, then the government would have to act as a creditor, take
control of the bank, and manage the sale of its assets. I doubt the government
wants to be in charge of such a proceeding and this form of action should be
reserved for a last case scenario. Thus, just as a bank would increase the interest
rate on a party who violates the provisions of their contract, the government should
reciprocate the same behavior with the increase in cumulative dividends paid on
preferred stock.
334. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act § 101(a). The Secretary has the
authority to determine the terms and conditions by which the TARP purchases
troubled assets from any financial institution. Id. Under this provision, the
Secretary would be merely exercising the same authority to amend the terms and
conditions that the Secretary originally established. According to a standard
deciding between the Secretary's options to create this rule using
rulemaking procedures or adjudication, the Secretary would most
likely follow rulemaking procedures because it would be more
advantageous in this situation.335 As is the general practice of
rulemaking,336 the Secretary would most likely follow informal
rulemaking procedures as described in the Administrative Procedure
Act.337  Given the fact that this rulemaking procedure would apply
dictionary, a rule is a "prescribed guide for conduct or action." MERRIAM-
WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY at 1023 (10th ed. 1993). However, for the
purposes of administrative agencies, the Administrative Procedure Act defines a
"rule" as "an agency statement of general or particular applicability and future
effect designed to implement, interpret, or prescribe law or policy." 5 U.S.C. §
551(4) (2007). Consequences enforced against financial institutions that violate the
TARP would fall under the APA's definition because this rule would apply to all
financial institutions participating in the TARP and would only consider future
violations of the TARP.
335. The Supreme Court has held that the choice to follow rulemaking or
adjudication procedures is generally the agency's to make. NLRB v. Bell
Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 294-295 (1974). The only time an agency has no
choice in the matter, is when a statute requires otherwise. See, e.g., Michigan v.
EPA, 744 F.2d 1145 (5th Cir. 1984) (holding that EPA could not determine issues
under the Clean Air Act on an adjudicative case-by-case basis, where Clean Air
Act required it to follow notice-and-comment rulemaking). Under the EESA, there
is no statute requiring a specific rule procedure. Thus, the Secretary can choose the
procedure that best fits this issue. The Secretary would probably choose to follow
rulemaking procedures because these consequences are supposed to apply for the
future actions of all financial institutions and not for holding a single entity
accountable for their specific past actions, as adjudication would provide. See Bi-
Metallic Invest. Co. v. State Bd. Of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441, 445-46 (1915).
Rulemaking is also more efficient for the agency because it can result in the
adoption of a general principle that can thereafter be applied without
reexamination, thereby eliminating the need for many case-by-case adjudications.
WERHAN, supra note 316 at 177. By correctly following rulemaking procedures,
this would allow the only enforcement issue to be whether or not the defendant
actually violated the established rule. Id.
336. Id. at 165.
337. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2007). There are four basic steps for informal
rulemaking. Id. at § 553(b)-(d). First, the agency must publish a "notice of
proposed rulemaking," which is typically done in the Federal Register. Id. at §
553(b). "The notice shall include a statement of the time, place, and nature of
public rule making proceedings; reference to the legal authority under which the
rule is proposed; and either the terms or substance of the proposed rule or a
description of the subjects and issues involved." Id. at § 553(b)(l)-(3). Second, the
agency must allow a comment period to allow "interested persons an opportunity to
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the rule equally against all financial institutions for their future
actions, the Secretary should also include a waiver provision to allow
a party the opportunity to show that this rule should not be applied to
its individual case. 338 Either one of these methods, a Congressional
enactment or an informal rulemaking by the Secretary. could
establish consequences for not following the TARP provisions, so
long as they only apply to the future actions of financial institutions
and do not attempt to be retroactive.
The fifth recommended change to the EESA would be to
determine a wvay to increase the overall transparency of the TARP
and to reconcile any conflicting reporting. Even though Congress
has had the foresight to create oversight in the EESA, this oversight
was probably established because congressional "consensus seemed
to have been reached by including everyone's favorite idea in the bill,
with no one thinking hard about how all of them fit together and
whether more oversight is necessarily better than less. - 339 Under the
EESA, there are eleven different entities that prepare and issue a total
of eighteen different types of reports. 40 No single entity, including
Congress or the "appropriate committees of Congress," receives all
participate in the rule making through submission of written data, views or
arguments with or without opportunity for oral presentation." Id. at § 553(c).
Depending on the complexity, most rulemakings should include a comment period
of at least sixty days. Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51735 (1993).
However, the comment period may also be less than 60 days as it was with the
TLG Program which included a fifteen day comment period. Temporary Liquidity
Guarantee Program, 73 Fed. Reg. at 72,244. Third, the agency has a duty to
consider the public comments. 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (2007). Fourth, the agency must
publish their final rules in the Federal Register which must also include a concise
general statement of the rule's basis and purpose. Id. After the final rule is
published, it will take effect as law in "not less than 30 days." Id. at § 553(d). In
addition to section 553 procedures of the APA, there may also be government-wide
procedural requirements that must be complied with before the rule becomes
official.
338. See United States v. Storer Broad. Co., 351 U.S. 192. 201-02 (1956); see
also FPC v. Texaco, 377 U.S. 33. 39 (1964) ("In the present case, as in Storer,
there is a procedure provided in the regulations whereby an applicant can ask for a
waiver of the rule complained of').
339. Alan Morrison, Plugging Leaks in the Bailout, LEGAL TIME. November
10, 2008, http: '/wx\w.law.com/jsp dc PubArticleDC.jspid=1202425807997.
340. Reporting Requirements, supra note 185, at 14-17.
of the reports. 341 Instead, the eighteen different reports are submitted
to six various entities.342  Furthermore, the EESA has created
reporting responsibilities that overlap between the different oversight
entities.3 43  It may have been Congress's original intent for such
overlap to occur, believing that it would be a benefit to have different
341. The EESA defines the appropriate committees of Congress to be
. . the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, the
Committee on Finance, the Committee on the Budget, and the
Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and the Committee
on Financial Services, the Committee on Ways and Means, the
Committee on Financial Services, the Committee on Ways and
Means, the Committee on the Budget, and the Committee on
Appropriations of the House of Representatives.
Emergency Economic Stabilization Act § 3(1).
342. Reporting Requirements, supra note 185, at 10. The 7 various entities
that receives the reports required by the EESA are: (1) the appropriate
congressional committees; (2) a subset of those appropriate committees; (3)
Congress as a whole; (4) the COP; (5) the SIG TARP; (6) the President of the
United States; and (7) the public. Id.
343. The first example of this is that the FSOB and the COP are both required
to review how the Secretary of the Treasury uses the authority provided in the
EESA. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act §§ 104(g); 125(b)(1)(A)(i). A
second example deals with the CG and the SIG TARP both having the general
responsibility of overseeing the activities and performances of the TARP and
auditing the purchase, management, and sale of assets under any EESA Section 101
program. Id. at §§ 116(a)(1), 121(c)(1). The CG and the SIG TARP also have
overlapping specific responsibilities. The CG has the specific duty to describe the
"characteristics and dispositions of acquired assets." Id. at § 116(a)(1)(D). The
SIG TARP has a similar specific duty to provide a description of the different
categories of troubled assets procured by the Secretary, along with a listing of the
troubled assets in each such category. Id. at § 121(c)(1)(A)-(B). Another overlap
occurs between the Secretary and the COP. The Secretary must issue a report "not
later than April 30, 2009, analyzing the current state of the regulatory system and
its effectiveness at overseeing the participants in the financial markets, including
the over-the-counter swaps market and government-sponsored enterprises, and
providing recommendations for improvement." Id. at § 105(c). Nearly three
months earlier, the COP had to submit a very similar report that analyzes the
current state of the regulatory system, its effectiveness at overseeing the
participants in the in the financial system, its effectiveness in protecting consumers,
and providing any recommendations for improvement. This reporting requirement
to provide a recommendation for improvement is the exact same reporting
requirement that the Secretary must comply with by "providing recommendations
for improvement, including recommendations regarding whether any participants
in the financial markets that are currently outside the regulatory system should
become subject to the regulatory system." Id. at §§ 125(b)(2); 105(c)(1)(A).
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perspectives on the same issue. However, this overlap could cause
inconsistent reporting between the oversight entities because they
may be relying on different information or using different valuation
methods, which would lead to various and sometimes conflicting
conclusions on the same issue. This could cause confusion as to
which report should be ultimately relied on by the administrative
agencies, Congress, and the president.
In addition, the current lack of transparency cannot satisfy one of
the defined purposes of the EESA, which is "to ensure that such
authority [exercised by the Secretary] and such facilities are used in a
manner that provides public accountability for the exercise of such
authority. ' ' 344 This purpose surely cannot be met when only one of
the eighteen different TARP reports is required to be made available
to the public. 345 Even though some of these reports have been issued
to the public without them being required to, there is still a lack of
public transparency, resulting in one of the main purposes of the
EESA not being satisfied. 346 However, all of these issues could be
addressed with Congress enacting a new administrative agency.
Congress could establish an "independent administrative
agency" 347 given the sole purpose to issue a single quarterly report
344. Id. at § 2(2)(D).
345. Reporting Requirements, supra note 185, at 12. This requires the TARP,
which is neither an individual nor an organization, to prepare and issue audited
financial statements to the appropriate committees of Congress and the public.
Emergency Economic Stabilization Act § 116(b)(1).
346. See supra note 344 and accompanying text.
347. If this administrative agency was established, it would most likely be a
legislative independent agency. This would allow Congress to appoint five or
seven individuals to be in charge and who would be somewhat insulated from
presidential control. These members would probably be evenly appointed by both
parties of Congress, as done with the members of the COP. See supra note 222 and
accompanying text. Similar to the FSOB, there should be a chairperson elected by
the members of the administrative agency. See supra note 189 and accompanying
text. The members of this administrative agency would be performing a lot of
work to compile, reconcile, and analyze the other eighteen EESA reports and these
members should be paid the daily rate of basic pay for level I of the Executive
Schedule for each day the member is performing agency duties. Since both parties
of Congress evenly get to decide the members of this administrative agency, then
both parties of Congress should also have to equally fund it like they did with the
COP. See supra note 236 and accompanying text. The administrative agency's
authority should remain in effect until the other eighteen EESA reports are
that analyzes, reconciles, and compiles the eighteen reports required
by the EESA. By giving this administrative agency the authority to
receive and question all eighteen of the EESA reports, then there
would finally be an entity with the access to all of the TARP
information. This would put the administrative agency in the best
position to publish a single quarterly report that could provide a
complete picture of the TARP with specificity and address any
conflicting, overlapping reports. Having this report serve as the
compilation of the eighteen other EESA reports, this quarterly report
should have the authority to be the main report relied upon when
dealing with issues that involve the TARP. In addition, by making
this authoritative report available to the public, it could fix the
EESA's lack of public transparency and satisfy one of the main
purposes of the EESA.348
VI. CONCLUSION
With the EESA being enacted within two weeks of its first draft,
Congress obviously left holes in it.3 49 Generally, it is common for
there to be some issues regarding the enactment because Congress
cannot be expected to be able to foresee all of the future
possibilities. 350  That is what happened with the EESA. When the
EESA was drafted, Congress believed the TARP would purchase the
toxic assets from the financial institutions and Congress drafted the
authorities, reports, funding, transparency, and oversight
accordingly. 351 Then, eleven days after the EESA was enacted, the
terminated and this administrative agency has covered all of such reports in its own
report.
348. Supra note 344 and accompanying text.
349. See supra notes 41-51 and accompanying text. After the first draft of the
EESA was proposed, the current draft of the EESA was passed in the House of
Representatives and the Senate and was enacted into law by President Bush two
weeks later. Id.
350. Aziz Huq, Constitutional License, TOMPAINE.COM, Jan. 24, 2006,
http://www.tompaine.com/articles/2006/01/24/constitutionallicense.php.
351. Scott Wacholtz, Treasury Bailout Won't Buyi Toxic Assets,
MARKETS.COM, Dec. 3, 2008, http://www.markets.com/story/Markets-6202008-
US-TreasuryBailoutWontBuyToxicAsset.php. In early October, the Secretary
announced that the TARP would not be utilized to purchase mortgage-backed
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Secretary changed the course of the TARP from purchasing toxic
assets to making capital injections.352 The EESA provisions, as they
were originally drafted, were not intended to cover this change of
policy; thus, the EESA cannot adequately be used as it was
intended.353 This is why the EESA has come under such public
scrutiny for the lack of transparency, oversight, accountability,
consequences, and applicable provisions.
354
In the near future, Congress will most likely amend the EESA to
address its present and foreseeable issues. It will be interesting to see
whether Congress amends the EESA using regulatory reform for all
financial institutions or will Congress simply amend the EESA
provisions themselves. 355 In the mean time, the Secretary should
follow informal rulemaking procedures to attempt to address the
EESA's issues, until Congress finally amends the EESA.356
Regardless of who implements the new provisions, they must address
the issues regarding the EESA's oversight, TARP programs,
transparency, accountability, and consequences for the financial
institutions that do not comply with applicable provisions.
Congress needs to utilize its remaining ingredients in a way that
mixes well together in order to create a successful bailout recipe. 357
Even with a successful recipe, this is still not enough. Congress also
needs to explicitly establish a procedure to execute the recipe. 358
These are the steps Congress needs to take in order ensure a
successful bailout of the financial institutions and to accomplish the
purposes for the EESA being enacted.359
securities. Id. This came as a shock because the purchase of these securities had
been the primary justification for Congress's passage of the TARP. Id.
352. Id. Regardless, the Secretary changed the focus of TARP to use the funds
for direct capital injections into troubled financial institutions to help facilitate
increased lending and credit. Id. The Secretary believed this to be a more efficient
use of the bailout funds than purchasing the mortgage backed securities. Id.
353. See supra note 351 and accompanying text.
354. See generally supra note 287-348 and accompanying text.
355. See supra note 322-24 and accompanying text.
356. See supra note 334-38 and accompanying text.
357. Kimball, Creamy Foolproof Dessert Souffls, at 23-24.
358. Id. at 24-25.
359. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act § 2. The purposes of the EESA
are to immediately restore liquidity and stability to the financial system in a manner
that protects taxpayers' equity, preserve homeownership, maximize overall returns
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to the taxpayers, and provide public accountability. Emergency Economic
Stabilization Act § 2.
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